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My dissertation comprises three chapters. The first chapter analyzes how eco-
nomic shocks from the housing market impact the labor market and family formation
decisions in the US. The second chapter explores the determinants of household fuel
choices in India accounting for women bargaining and village infrastructure. The
third chapter assesses impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on the bilateral
trades.
The first chapter assesses the impact of housing cycles in the USA on the family
formation decisions. Pooling together information from datasets such as the Current
Population Survey (CPS), Vital Statistics Natality data, the FHFA Housing Price
Index (HPI), I construct outcomes at the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) level
for various years, and exploit the variation in change in housing demand across MSAs
to study the impact of housing demand shocks experienced by MSAs on the family
formation outcomes in the MSAs. Recognizing the endogeneity of housing shocks, I
use the magnitude of structural breaks in housing prices as instrument for housing
shocks experienced by an MSA. The result support the hypothesis that increased
employment opportunities during housing boom make men more marriageable but the
impact of increased employment opportunities for women remain ambiguous because
of countervailing positive and negative income and independence effect.
The second dissertation chapter investigates the fuel choice behavior of households
using a large nationally representative panel data in India. Recognizing that the
household choices are not independent over time, I use multinomial random and fixed
effects models. The improvement over existing literature come from not only use of
panel data, but also use of various women bargaining information and village level
infrastructure. Women’s education attainment and financial independence increase
the plausibility of household using clean fuel. The existence of paved road is also an
important determinant of household’s decision in adopting clean fuel.
In the third chapter, I examine the impact of being connected to Silk Road railways
on the 13 destination countries bilateral trade with China. To address the issue of
endogenous placement of railways, I utilize the generalized synthetic control method.
I find that the railway connections do not have significant impacts on either gross
import or gross export of destination countries. The results are robust to alternative
methods, across product categories, and different grouping of destination countries
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CHAPTER I
HOUSING BOOMS AND BUSTS AND FAMILY FORMATION OF
YOUNG GENERATIONS
1. Introduction
Household formation has become a critical issue in the US due to significant changes
in the household structure, such as an increase in the number of single-headed house-
holds (Black, McKinnish,and Sanders, 2003) and non-marital birth (Kearney and
Wilson, 2018). Moreover, millennials tend to live with their parents or relatives and
delay their transition to adulthood: leaving home, completing education, securing a
job, marrying or cohabiting, and having children (Settersten and Ray, 2010; Sironi and
Furstenberg, 2012; Sironi, 2018).1 Local economic conditions should play a pivotal
role in young people’s decision making. For example, Schaller (2016) finds demand-
induced changes in labor market conditions at the state level influence the fertility.
Kearney and Wilson (2018) find PUMA-level fracking boom increased wages and jobs
for non-college educated men, both marital and nonmarital birth rates increase, but
marriage rates do not. Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2019) exploit the differential im-
pact of rising international manufacturing competition from China during 1990–2014
across commuting zones, and find that larger competition induced a negative local
labor demand shock reducing employment and earnings of young adult males and co-
1Both young men and women since 1970s has postponed the transition and spent longer time to achieve each of
them (Sironi and Furstenberg, 2012).
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ontributed to reduction in marriage and fertility. In this paper, I investigate a hypothesis:
housing booms and busts change young people’s labor market and economic conditions,
and the economic security affects their marriage and fertility decisions.
Following Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2018), I generate MSA-level housing de-
mand shocks during 2000-2006, which is the sum of changes in local housing prices and
changes in housing supply. Using the cross-MSA level variation in the housing booms, I
study the impact of housing booms on MSA level labor market opportunities for all young
men/women.2 I then use a reduced-form model to analyze relationship between housing
booms and demographic outcomes: marriage rates, fertility rates, and nonmarital birth
rates. Admittedly, measurement error may exist in the housing demand shock and some
latent factors that are associated with housing demand shocks may be omitted. To re-
solve plausible problems of endogeneity, I exploit cross-MSA variation in the magnitude
of structure breaks of local housing price as an instrument variable (IV). As noted by
others (Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo 2018; Shiller 2008; Mayer 2011; Sinai 2012) the
variation in housing prices during the boom and bust derived from a speculative “bub-
ble” and not from changes in standard determinants of housing values such as income,
population, or construction costs (Shiller 2008; Mayer 2011; Sinai 2012), and hence the
magnitude of structural breaks should be exogenous to unobserved local variables. The
IV should not have a systematic relationship with pre-period observed variables. In the
section 2.1, I show that the previous marriage rates and changes in marriage are not
related to the IV.3
The housing cycles since 1990s in US has attracted extensive attention.4 Strikingly,
there is only a limited literature examining housing shocks on the family formation deci-
sions, and most existing literature pay more attention to the effect of changes in housing
2Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2018) established that 2000-2006 housing booms increased employment opportunities
and wage for young individuals without college degree. I extend their analysis to all young.
3For the fertility outcomes, although there is no relation between previous nonmarital birth rate and structural breaks,
I fail to reject that IV is uncorrelated with previous fertility rate.
4In addition to a wider debate about the relationship between housing cycles and business cycles on the basis of macroe-
conomic analysis (e.g., Leamer, 2007; Ghent and Owyang, 2010), some papers focus on the micro-economic consequence of
the real estate market fluctuation: saving and consumption (e.g., Skinner, 1994; Sheiner,1995; Campbell and Cocco 2007;
Corradin and Popov 2015 ), household mobility (e.g., Engelhardt,2003; Ferreira, Gyourko, and Tracy, 2010), and labor
supply (e.g., Farnham and Sevak, 2015; Rogers and Winkler, 2014; Laeven and Popov, 2016; Mian and Sufi, 2014; Charles,
Hurst, and Notowidigdo, 2018).
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costs—rents, housing prices, or mortgage. Rogers and Winkler (2014) examine whether
housing market conditions, measured by the MSA-level housing prices, rents as well as
foreclosure rates, during 2006-2011 affect the decision to live independently among peo-
ple age 22-34. Through logit models, they find that housing prices has no significant
impacts. OLS estimation results in Bowmaker and Emerson (2015) show a negative re-
lationship between the burden of housing costs and marriage rate in US counties during
1970 to 1999. Using MSA-level CPS data, Farnham, Schmidt, and Sevak (2011) find
fall in housing prices decreases homeowners’ divorce risk relative to renters because high
transaction costs make them locked into house/marriage.
With regard to fertility, more articles discuss about the connection between household
income and fertility. Based on the model of fertility (Becker 1960; Becker and Lewis,
1973), an increase in husband’s wage increase the demand of children through an income
effect with the assumption that children are normal goods. Differently, an increase in
woman’s wage generates not only income effect but also substitution effect because of
a higher cost of children. Also, considering a quantity-quality trade-off, household with
higher income may pursue a higher quality of children instead of demand of children.
That is, the negative relationship between income and fertility may exist. The puzzle
with models is not completely answered by empirical evidence.5
Focusing on the wealth changes from the US housing market, Lovenheim and Mumford
(2013) use probability models and the PSID data to analyze whether fertility decision
is affected by changes in housing wealth at state or MSA levels measured by individ-
ual housing prices. When housing prices increase, the probability to have a child for
homeowners age 25-44 increase by around 17%, which reflects housing wealth effect on
homeowners’ fertility decision. They also find no impact among renters. Dettling and
Kearney (2014) analyze the effect of MSA-level housing prices during 1997-2007 on lo-
cal fertility rates of women age 20-44. Compared to Lovenheim and Mumford (2013)
studying the effect of housing prices on homeowners and renters separately, Dettling and
5Some empirical analysis observe a negative correlation between income and fertility, such as Jones, Schoonbroodt, and
Tertilt (2010) and Lindo (2010), while some other find a positive relationship, such as Lovenheim and Mumford (2013).
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Kearney (2014) adopt OLS and IV models and add an interaction term between housing
price and ownership rate in the regression for distinguishing housing wealth effect and
substitution effect. Due to the probability of reverse causality or unobservable variables
that may affect both fertility and housing prices, they utilize the MSA supply elasticity
as an instrument. They find a positive wealth effect as Lovenheim and Mumford (2013),
but they also find a negative substitution effect: a rise in housing price decreases fertility
rate because for potential homeowners higher costs of housing may decrease the demand
of children with the assumption that children are normal goods.6
Different from these literature, I exploit changes in both prices and quantities of hous-
ing instead of only housing prices to capture changes in labor market conditions due to
housing cycle and thereby the decision on family formation. Moreover, I consider men
and women separately in the analysis of marriage rate as changes in economic conditions
generate different impacts on young men and women. Improvement in employment and
wages positively affect men’s marriage (e.g., Gary, 1981; Gibson-Davis, 2009; Gibson-
Davis, Edin, and McLanahan 2005, Sironi and Furstenberg, 2012) while the effect for
women is ambiguous (Becker, 1965; Mincer, 1962). Women who have ability to be eco-
nomically independent tend to delay marriage, and this is so-called women’s independence
effect (Oppenheimer, 1997). Nevertheless, a woman’s income can lead a family to have a
higher standard of living. The income effect makes women more likely to marry. Hence
the effect of changes in economic condition on women depends on which effect dominates.
Using the data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), four panels of Figure 1
plot share of persons who reported being married separately for men and women in the
18-25 and 26-33 age groups. Marriage rate steadily declines since 1980. However, from
around 1998, an upward deviation in the marriage rates from the trendline is observed
among four groups. This is also the time when the housing boom started. At the end
6My fertility analysis is much similar to Dettling and Kearney (2014), but we have several differences. First, my analysis
focus on a more recent housing cycle, the 2000-2006 boom and the 2006-212 bust, while they have a boom period between
1997-2006 and two bust periods, 1990-1996 and 2007-2009. Second, I study fertility rate of younger women aged 18-33 and
restrict the sample by the condition that women’s residence is occurrence place to remove the possibility of immigration.
They analyze women age 20-44 instead. Moreover, I have a sample of 235 MSAs while they have 154 MSAs afetr merging
all main dataset.
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of boom and during the bust period 2007-2012, while the marriage rates for women age
26-33 gradually converge towards the trend, the marriage rates for the other three groups
of people do not show convergence towards trend. Figure 2 plots the share of married for
different birth cohorts in MSAs that belong to top tercile of the price increase between
2000-2006 and MSAs that belong to bottom two terciles of the housing price increase
between 2000-2006.7 As evident from the Figure, marriage rate is higher in MSA that
experienced lower increment in housing prices during 2000-2006. It is worth noting that
although marriage rates were declining among both group of MSA beginning 1970, some
divergence in marriage rates between the two group of MSAs is evident around and after
the 1976 birth cohort. Individuals born over 1975 and 1980 are my focus group because
they were experiencing the 2000 housing boom when they were aged over 18. Figure 1 and
Figure 2 provide initial assessment that the housing booms could have affected marriage
rates and the effects may differ by gender.
Utilizing data from the National Center for Health Statistic (NCHS) and the vital
statistics jurisdictions, Figure 3 shows the fertility rate for MSA grouped on the basis of
terciles of housing price growth between 2000 and 2006 where the sample is restricted
to mothers age 25-48 belonging to 1965-1987 birth cohorts. As evident from the Figure,
there was a relatively larger increase in fertility rate for 1975-1980 cohorts living in
the top-tercile MSAs. Moreover, how changes in economic condition affect nonmarital
birth rate is also one of the interests in this paper. Rising rate of nonmarital birth has
triggered great attention recently. Kalil and Ryan (2010) defines a household formed due
to a nonmarital birth as a fragile family, which is relatively vulnerable to poverty and
material hardship. Understanding the factors that may change the rate of nonmarital
birth rate may help policy makers to know how to support this type of families. Figure 4
presents the difference of normarital birth rate between 1975-1980 cohorts living in the
top-tercil MSAs and in the bottom-two-tercile MSAs is smaller. The rate of nonmatial
birth over 1975-1980 cohorts in the top-tercile grows relatively slower. The housing boom
7Two series in the figure are marriage rates of people age 25-54 living in their birth state and belonging to 1965-1987
birth cohorts, which are constructed by the 1990 and 2000 censuses and 2005-2013 American Community Survey (ACS).
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may cause a lower share of unmarried mother.
The findings of the paper are following. First, housing booms result into higher em-
ployment rate and a higher wage rate for young individuals age 18-25, while individuals
age 26-33 only experienced a marginal increase in employment rate. Moreover, the im-
pact of housing booms differs for men and women. While the housing boom increased
employment for 26-33 aged men, it has no impact on 26-33 aged women. Though housing
boom has similar impact on the employment opportunities for men and women in age
18-25, it resulted in much higher increase in average wages for men age 18-25. Second, I
find that the housing booms increased the marriage among young men age 18-25 but is
does not have significant impact on women’s marriage rate in same age group. Moreover,
I do not find any significant impact of housing boom on marriage rate of individuals age
26-33. Third, I find that housing booms led to increased fertility among 18-25 and 26-33
age group women, and decreased non-marital birth in both age groups. Fourth, during
the 2006-2012 bust, housing booms continuously and positively impact marriage for men
age 18-25, so the marriage rate at the end of the cycle does not return to the beginning
of the housing cycle. I find new cohorts of women in the 26-33 age group response to
the housing bust in a symmetric way: a lower marriage rate, a lower fertility rate, and a
higher nonmarital birth rate.
My finding—housing booms generated positive economic shock for young men/women
in age 18-25,but they only affected the marriage rate of men positively—supports the
idea that improved labor conditions for men make them more marriageable. Moreover,
as noted in the literature, the improved labor market conditions for women would lead
to two counteractive effects: income effects and independence effect. As a result, I do
not see impact on marriage rates for women in age 18-25. Increased fertility stemming
from positive labor demand shock is also not surprising. My results are in concordance
with Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2019) finding that increased import competition from
China that led to negative demand shock for blue color men workers decreased marriage
rate and fertility rate.
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This paper contributes to the literature in following ways. First, to the best of my
knowledge, this paper is the first paper that examine this channel: the impact of housing
boom/busts on family formation decisions though changes in labor market conditions.
I extend Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2018) work that focus on the impact of
housing booms/busts on the labor market outcomes for individuals in age 18-25 without
any college education to all men and all women ages 18-25 and 26-33. Second, I focus
on the outcomes of much younger generations, age 18-25 and 26-33, who are sensitive
to economic fluctuation (Sironi, 2018). Moreover, I analyze the effect of a more recent
housing cycle. Selecting the 2000-2013 cycle because recent literature have consensus
that changes in housing demands are the main source of the 2000s housing booms (e.g.
Shiller, 2008). This enables me to utilize changes in housing demand to measure the
housing boom and establish the channel.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the
data, construction of housing demand shock, construction of the instrument variable, and
empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the results for marriage rate and fertility rates,
and section 4 concludes.
2. Data and Empirical Approach
2.1. Local Housing Demand Shocks
Following Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2018), I construct the housing demand shock
across MSAs during the 2000-2006 boom for analyzing its effects on household formation.
The construction of the shock is based on recent consensus that the housing boom over
2000s mainly came from the changes in housing demand (e.g., Shiller 2008). Moreover,
the difference in local housing price appreciations among MSAs during the boom is
caused by both different changes in local housing demand (e.g., Ferreira and Gyourko,
2011) and in local housing supply elasticity (Mian and Sufi 2011). Using a log-linear
model of housing demand and housing supply, a local housing demand shock, ∆HDm , is
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in the following form:
∆HDm = η
D
m ∆Pm + ∆Qm (1)
where ∆Pm is the change in the log of local housing prices in MSA m, η
D
m is the price
elasticity of housing demand, and ∆Qm is the change in log of quantity of new housing..
Similar to Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2018), I take the existing estimates of the
elasticity of housing demand in the literature that suggest ηDm ≈ 1 to create proxy for
demand shock.8 The proxy of housing demand shock is equal to the sum of log difference
in local housing prices and log difference in quantity of housing in the MSA m. Both
housing prices and housing supply channels should influence local labor market in the
theory (Mian and Sufi, 2014; Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo, 2018). A rise in housing
prices can increase household wealth and liquidity, so it can stimulate local consumption
and employment. An increase in housing supply reflects a higher labor demand in the
local construction industry.
Using the MSA-level data of local housing price provided from Federal Housing Fi-
nance Agency (FHFA), I compute annual local housing prices by averaging quarterly
series of local housing price index (HPI) and manually match FHFA metro areas to the
ACS metro areas. I adjust nominal HPI to real HPI using CPI-U published by BLS. The
base year of HPI is 1995. The way FHFA metro area are matched to ACS metro area is
shown in Data Appendix. I use numbers of housing permits as a proxy for the housing
supply, i.e. the quantity of new housing.9 275 MSAs can be matched after I merge ACS
data with the FHFA and permits survey data.10
As noted by Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2018) and evident from Appendix
Figure A1, changes in housing prices and in housing permits during 2000 to 2006 are
positively correlated, which suggests role of housing permits in the local housing demand
shocks. Figure A2 plots the trend in the demand measure at 10th, 50th, and 90th
8Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2018) took the average of two widely-cited estimates of the housing demand elasticity
in the literature: 0.7 from Polinsky and Ellowood (1979) and 1.2 from Houthakker and Taylor (1970).
9I thank Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2018) for sharing housing permit data. Detail of permit data is given in
Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2018).
10Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2018) also has 275 MSAs.
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percentiles during 1990-2012. There is a significant changes at 90th percentile over boom
and bust periods comparing to changes at median and 10th percentile. Similar to Charles,
Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2018), I exploit the large variation in housing demand across
MSAs. The standard deviation across MSAs in the 2000-2006 is 0.464.11
Although changes in the housing demand shock is exogenous, potential measurement
error in construction of the shock leads to attenuation. In addition, biases can also
be caused by omitted unobserved factors that are correlated with the housing demand
shocks, such as other labor market factors or marriage policies. To address potential
endogeneity issues, I adopt a Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation strategy using
an Instrument variable (IV). Following Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2018) and
Ferreira and Gyourko (2011), I use the magnitude of sharp changes in housing prices in
each MSA over 2000-2006 as an instrument. The magnitude of sharp change in housing
prices captures exogenous variation in housing demand shock resulted from speculative
bubbles instead of the traditional determinants of housing prices (Ferreira and Gyourko,
2011; Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo, 2018). The fundamental concept behind is built
on the consensus that dramatic housing boom since around 2000 resulted from a high
expectations of future home values. Higher expected housing price level led to more
speculative housing investment (Shiller, 2008).12
To find the sharp changes, I use quarterly local housing prices between 2000q1 and
2005q1 and find a local structure break maximizing the R2 of the following MSA-specific
OLS regression:
PHm (t) = ωm + τm t+ λm(t− t∗m)1{t > t∗m}+ ξm,t (2)
where PHm (t) is the log of local real HPI in MSA m in year-quarter t. t
∗
m is the date of
11Standard deviation is 0.55 in Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2018). A lower standard deviation in this paper may
mainly be caused by the difference in base years of HPI. The base year of HPI is 1995 in my analysis while 1980 in their
work. I also rebase the CPI which used to make raw HPI a real variable.
12In Appendix Figure A3, I plot the quarterly housing prices for six sampled MSAs between 2000:I and 2005:IV. For the
three MSAs in the left panel, the evolution of prices over time has been smooth, while for the three MSAs in right panel
price series changed “sharply” at some point in the 2000s, suggesting the influence of some factor different from smooth
changes in fundamentals, such as the effect of a speculative bubble (Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo, 2018). Importantly,
the sharp change for different MSAs differ across MSAs, and I use the variation in magnitude of these sharp changes as
Instrument.
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the MSA-specific structure break between 2001q1 and 2005q1.13 λm is the magnitude of
the structure break in MSA m. τm captures a MSA-specific time trend before the break.
2.2. The Effect of Housing Boom on Family Formation
My interest is to examine the impact of housing shocks on family formation decisions
and labor market outcomes of young men/women. For this, I estimate the following
first-difference regressions:
∆Smt = β0 + βFD∆̂HDmt +Xmtβ3 + umt. (3)
where ∆̂HDmt is the change in housing demand as estimated by equation (1) and ∆Smt is
the change in outcome of interest over time t and t+k. The first differenced model account
for any time invariant MSA-level factors. Xmt include MSA-level baseline controls that
could cause differential trends in outcome variable: log of the age 18-55 population, the
employed with a college degree, foreign born share, female employment rate in 2000. βFD
is the parameter of interest.
The data for labor outcomes and marital status are constructed from the Census/ACS
samples. I restrict the data to people age 18-33 living in the birth state so as to exclude
the potential effects of migration. I also exclude people living in the group quarters. In my
analysis, I focus on outcomes measure in 2000, 2006, and 2012. While the labor/marriage
outcome variables in 2000 is computed from 2000 census, I use pooled ACS data over
2005-2007 and over 2011-2013 respectively to compute the outcome variables for year
2006 and 2012 for a more precise analysis at MSA-level.14
The fertility data is from the Vital Statistic Natality Files. Data of population by gen-
der and age are from the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) database.
The sample is restricted to woman in age categories 18-25 and 26-33 whose residence is
occurrence place. I map the data by the state and county Federal Information Processing
13Following Andrew (1993), I use 15% as of the left and right trimming percentage of sample period.
14In this paper, I mainly use METAREA code to merge data. The code is not available in 2012 and 2013 so I manually
match MET2013 code in these two years to METAREA.
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Standards (FIPS) codes to MSAs. I also exclude the MSAs with less than 5 natality data.
There are 235 MSAs remained. The fertility rate in year t at MSA m is equal to the
number of local birth over women population in a specific region. The nonmarital birth
rate is calculated by the number of local nonmarital birth over regional total birth.
Table 1 reports summary statistics of variables used in the analysis. The main sample
for housing market and marriage includes 275 MSAs. The first row of Table 1 shows MSA
housing demand shock rises by around 50% on average over the 2000-2006 boom period.
The housing demand shock contains price effect and supply effect. Second and third rows
displays that in the 50-percent increase in housing demand, 34.7 percent comes from the
change in housing prices during the housing boom, and the remaining part is from the
increase in housing supply (16 of 50 percent change). Arranging MSAs according to price
increase over 2000-2006, the housing prices increased by 71.9% for the 90th percentile
MSA and by 5.9% for the 10th percentile MSA. The second section of Table 1 are the
summary statistics of control variables. The remaining section has key outcome variables
of labor market, marriage, fertility rate, and nonmarital birth rate.
3. Results
3.1. Changes in Labor Outcomes from Housing Booms
Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2018) finds that housing booms improve the employ-
ment rate and average wage rate for young people age 18-25 without college degree during
booms, increasing the opportunity cost of acquiring a college degree. Extending the anal-
ysis to all education groups, I assess whether housing booms enhance the labor market
conditions and benefit all young men and women in two age categories, 18-25 and 26-33.
Table 2 shows the first-stage results that suggest a strong relation between the size of
structure break and changes in housing demand shock. Table 3 presents both OLS and
2SLS results in Panel A and panel B respectively.15
15Table 3 only presents the effect of 2000-2006 housing demand change on labor market outcomes. The full result of
OLS estimate is shown in Table A1.
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OLS results suggest positive and statistically significant impacts of change in housing
demand over 2000-2006 on both change in employment and change in average real wages
for people age 18-25 over 2000 to 2006. In panel A, OLS results suggest that 100 log
points increase in housing demand lead to 2.2 percentage points increase in employment
for all young in age 18-25, and 2.5 and 3.3 percentage points increase in employment for
men and women in age 18-25, respectively. Moreover, real wage rate increases by 6.4, 8.1,
and 4.0 percent for all, men and women age 18-25 as a result of 100 log point increase in
housing demand. Thus the OLS results suggest improved labor market opportunities for
young in age 18-25, and importantly improvement is observed by both genders. There
are smaller positive impacts on people in the age group of 26-33. A 100 log points
increase in housing demand shocks induce 1.5 percentage point and 3.4 percent increase
in employment rate and average wage rate for people in this 26-33 age group. While,
OLS results suggest positive impact of change housing demand for men in age 26-33, I
could not reject the null of no impact for women in the 26-33 age group.
In panel B of Table 3, the 2SLS point estimates are generally larger than OLS es-
timates indicating dominance or presence of attenuation bias caused by measurement
error. The 2SLS estimates suggest that a 100 log point increase in housing demand in-
creased employment rate of all young, young men, and young women in age group 18-25
by 3, 3.6, and 4.1 percentage points respectively. At the same time, the same increase in
housing demand increased wages by 8, 10.7, 3.2 percent for all, men, and women in age
group 18-25. A one standard deviation change in housing demand shock is 0.49 across
MSAs. In other words, a one standard deviation (SD) increase in housing demand causes
1.4, 1.8, and 2 percentage point increase in employment for all people, men, and women
in age group 18-25 respectively.16 Similarly, a one SD increase in housing demand in-
crease the wages of all, men, and women in age group 18-25 by 4, 5.2, and 1.5 percent,
respectively. The IV results suggest a much weaker effects of housing demand increase
16The percentage point change is calculated by the coefficient from the table times the standard deviation of change
in housing demand shock. For example, a one standard deviation increase in housing demand results in 3.6 × 0.49 = 1.8
percentage point increase in employment for men age 18-25.
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for age 26-33. Changes in housing demand shocks by 100 log points make employment
rate for people age 26-33 increase by 1.9 percentage points which is higher than the OLS
estimate in panel A. Importantly, there is no statistically significant impact of wages of
26-33 age group. While the impact on employment of 26-33 aged men is statistically
significant, the impact on employment of 26-33 aged women is statistically insignificant.
There is no impact on the wages of either gender in 26-33 age group.
The main measure of housing demand combined both change in housing prices and
change in housing supply, and assumes that the effects of each of the two components
are similar. I examine whether the effect of housing demand mainly comes from one of
them by considering ∆Pk and ∆Qk as separate variables in OLS model. The results are
reported in Appendix Table A217 As evident from the OLS results, both components
of housing demand have positive and fairly similar effects. That is, increases in housing
prices and housing supply increase employment and wages for young people. Moreover, to
assess whether housing demand shocks impact the local labor market differently because
of distinct level of local housing supply elasticity, I include the local housing supply
elasticity estimates from Saiz (2010) and its interaction term with the housing demand
shock in the regressions. In 2SLS models, I have two IVs: the size of structure breaks in
housing prices and its interaction term with the supply elasticity. I do not find differential
effects of housing demand changes due to different supply elasticities. These results
support that the effect of changes in housing prices and in supplies are similar, so the
combination of both changes is exploited in the rest of the analysis in this paper.
Overall, the results of labor market outcomes confirm that the housing boom boosts
labor market conditions especially for younger age group, 18-25-year-olds. For people
age 26-33, the improvement in labor market conditions is mainly in men’s employment.
17I could not implement the IV strategy as I only have one instrument variable
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3.2. Changes in Marriage Rate from Housing Booms
As discussed in the last section, main mechanism—enhancement in young people’s eco-
nomic conditions—through which housing booms effect family formation decisions exist.
Having established that housing booms may generate an income/wealth effect for young
individuals, I move to the reduced form effects of housing booms on marriage outcomes.
In this section, I focus on marriage rate as well as the share of other marital status,
including cohabitation, divorce, and never married. If the shocks indeed change their
decision in starting a family, some shares of these status at the aggregate level may be
affected.
Panel A of Table 4 shows the IV impacts of housing booms on various measures
of marital status for all 18-25-year-olds.18 The IV estimate is statistically significant for
share of married outcome at 10% significance level, and there is no statistically significant
effect on other outcomes such as share of divorced, share of cohabitation, or share of non-
married. A one standard deviation increase in housing demand shock increases marriage
rate by 0.8 percentage points. Panel B and Panel C of Table present the results for
men and women, separately. The impact of housing boom on marriage rate for men
is statistically significant. Although the sign of the IV estimate for share of married
outcome is positive for young women also, I cannot reject the null of no effect.
Moreover, I find no effect on share of cohabitation, which includes same-sex and
different-sex cohabitation. In terms of divorce rate, there is only modest positive impacts
for men age 18-25 (0.1 percent). Noticeably, there is no significant effect of housing shock
on marital outcomes 26-33-year-olds. Considering that home ownership may affect their
marriage status based on the literature, such as Farnham, Schmidt, and Sevak (2011),
the last column extends baseline model of marriage rate with an extra control, home
ownership rate. The result is almost as same as the baseline model.
Pooling together marriage outcomes (Table 4) and labor outcomes results (Table 3),
18Table 4 only presents the effect of 2000-2006 housing demand change on marriage status. The full marriage result of
OLS estimate is shown in Table A3.
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although housing boom increased the labor opportunities for both young men and women
in age 18-25 age group, the housing boom only increased the share of married for young
men and not for young women. As discussed earlier, theoretical predictions in the litera-
ture suggest that while the increased labor opportunities make men more marriageable,
the impact of increased labor opportunity for women in ambiguous because of opposing
independence effect and income effects.19
3.3. Changes in Fertility Rate from Housing Booms
In this section, I look at whether the birth outcomes among people age 18-25 and 26-33
changed as a result of housing booms. The fertility results are presented in Table 5. The
IV estimates suggest that fertility rate for women in 18-25 age group increases by 1.2
percentage points in response to a one standard deviation increase in housing demand
shock, whereas fertility rate for women in age 26-33 group increases by a marginally
higher 1.4 percent. In contrast, nonmarital birth rates decrease during housing booms
for both age groups. A one standard deviation increase in housing demand shock reduces
nonmarital birth rate by 2.6 and 1.4 percent for 18-25-year-olds and 26-33-year-olds
respectively.
Connecting the fertility result with Table 3, younger people age 18-25 are more sen-
sitive to the housing boom, but their changes in fertility rate are smaller during the
boom comparing to older age group even though this is not a big difference. This can be
explained by the literature that, similar to the analysis of marriage rate, a better labor
market condition usually increases the possibility to have a baby for men, yet the effect
for women sometime would offset by opportunity costs of working. Table 3 suggests
housing boom has impact on men in the 26-33 age group but not women in the same age
group, while it has influence on both men and women in the 18-25. Hence, the results in
Table 5 implies the coefficients for people age 18-25 capture the offsetting effect, so it is
19I also explore the effect of housing demand shocks on marriage rates of homeowners and renters separately. The results
are shown in the Appendix Table A4. A caveat here is that homeownership/renter rates in MSA might itself be affected
by change in housing prices over time introducing a bias in the measurement of outcome variables. The housing demand
shocks still have a significant impact on the marriage of younger homeowners age 18-25 but no impact on the marriage of
homeowners in the older age group.
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relatively smaller than the effect for people age 26-33.
The impact of economic shocks on fertility is ambiguous. The effect of improvement
in economic conditions on fertility may reflect a net effect involving wealth effect and
substitution effect. The wealth effect implies children are normal goods. When labor
market conditions has improved, extra wealth brings a higher fertility rate. However,
higher return in working means a higher opportunity costs of parental time, and leads a
lower fertility rate. A few papers find local adverse economic shocks cause reduction in
birth rate (Ananat, Gassman-Pines, and Gibson-Davis, 2013; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson,
2019) and an increase in unmarried mothers (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2019), while
Kearney and Wilson (2018) finds a positive economic shocks make both fertility rate
and nonmarital birth increase. My fertility results that suggest positive demand shock
increased fertility is in concordance with Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2019) and Kearney
and Wilson (2018) as positive demand shock boosts birth rate. However, my results
on non-marital births are in contrast to Kearney and Wilson (2018). While I find that
increased labor demand reduced non-marital birth, Kearney and Wilson (2018) find that
local-area fracking boom that increased wages and jobs for non-college educated men
increased both marital and nonmarital birth rates. I think of two possible reasons for
differences. First, I look at all young individuals, while Kearney and Wilson (2018)
focus on non-college educated. Second, the nature of demand shock in my case have a
much wider impact compared to fracking boom which is more likely to have impacts on
non-college educated groups.
Of course, the birth rate may not precisely capture the time young people decide to
have a baby because the decision may be made before the birth year. There may also
be a delayed effect on birth rates. Young parents should feel they are better off and
then decide to have a baby. Therefore, I change the outcome period to 2000-2007. The
estimation is shown in column (3) and (4) in the Table 5. The result is rather consistent
with the baseline result. If I modify the period to 2001-2007 in column (5) and (6), the
effect is smaller and less significant. Shocks during housing boom seem to affect only
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fertility rate for people 26-33, but the sign of coefficients remain the same. In addition,
Dettling and Kearney (2014) analyzing the effect of housing costs on fertility rate find
the home ownership has significant impact on fertility rate. If a household have a house,
the housing booms should bring extra wealth to this family, and this may lead to a higher
birth rate. The omission of home ownership may cause omitted-variable problems. Since,
Vital Statistics data do not contain ownership information, I add home ownership rate
in MSA in 2000 from the ACS data as an extra control variable in the model. In the
column (7) and (8), the results are similar to results in the baseline model.
Another way to measure birth rate is to exploit the year of conception. I use the
month of birth and the length of gestation to find the approximate year of conception,
so I can calculate the share of conception in a year. The results for this new birth rate
are presented in Table A5 in the Appendix. There is no significant impact for women in
two age categories, but the signs of coefficients remain the same.
3.4. Placebo Analysis
In this section, I examine whether the results in the previous sections are indeed capturing
the causal effect of housing booms, or the regressions may simply be capturing the pre-
existing trend. Using the baseline model, Table 6 presents the results of placebo tests for
marriage outcome. I basically examine whether the 2000-2006 change in housing demand
predicts the growth in average marriage rate from earlier period 1990-1996. The marriage
rates for the 1990 and 1996 are computed from the CPS data as annual ACS data are
not available over 1990-2000. As evident from the Table, IV estimates are statistically
insignificant for both age groups and genders considered. Although this does not prove
that my main results are not driven by time invariant factors that line up with variation
in the housing demand or magnitude of structural breaks, but increase confidence in the
main results as I can rule out any pre-existing trends in the outcome.
In Table 7, I present the placebo tests using change in fertility rate and nonmarital
birth rates over 1990-1996. Although there is no correlation between pre-boom change
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in fertility outcome and housing boom for women in age group 18-25, I find a negative
correlation between fertility and housing booms for women in age group 26-33. It is
important to note that the correlation between housing booms and 1990-1996 change in
fertility rate is negative, however, in my main results I find positive impact of housing
boom on fertility rate. This suggests that my main fertility results underestimate the
impacts on fertility for women in 26-33 age group.
3.5. Family Formation and Housing Busts
In this section, I examine the effect of shock from housing busts in the 2006-2012 period
as well as entire 2000-2012 period spanning the entire boom and bust cycle. I use the
fact that MSAs that witnessed larger booms during 2000-2006 period also experienced
larger busts during 2006-2012 (as evident in Figure A5). By correlating the housing
boom during 2000-2006 to change in outcomes over 2006-2012, I check whether the size
of housing boom has a persistent effect or the effects of housing booms were reversed for
new cohorts during the housing busts.
Column (1) in Table 8 is the baseline result. The shock from housing booms has
a persistently positive impact on 18-25-year-olds during housing bust. In other words,
during economic downturn, younger generations may still have higher marriage rate, this
is different from my expectation. However, it generate a reversed effect for people age
26-33, especially for women. The results of the entire housing cycle seem to align with the
initial assessment of Figure 1. For all, men, and women in the 18-25 age group, marriage
rates at the end of cycle positively deviate from the 2000 level when the housing boom
started while there is a convergence in marriage rate for women age 26-33.
To understand the plausible reasons of the persistent effect on the 18-25-year-olds, I
firstly check if this effect is disappeared over time, because they might have made decision
to marry at the end of the housing boom. I investigate the outcome by two sub-periods
of housing bust, 2006-2009 and 2009-2012, and by the period from 2008 when the Great
Depression starts to 2012. The size of housing boom has no or very small impact on
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marriage rate of 18-25-year-olds. I also looked at the effect of housing demand shock
with extra control—the share of ownership rate at the beginning of the housing bust, but
the results are similar to the baseline model.20
Table 9 presents the results for the fertility rate during the bust period. The size
of housing boom during 2000-2006 has no persistent impact on fertility rate and non-
marital birth rate for women in 18-25 during housing busts. However, we can see a
reversed effect for women age 26-33 during the housing busts. In response to an adverse
economic condition during the housing bust, the fertility rate of women in the older age
group is lower, but the ratio of nonmarital birth increases, which is consistent with Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson (2019). In fact, Schaller (2016), who use state level data to check if
children are normal good as assumed in the Becker’s model, find that the fertility rate is
procyclical. My result also supports the idea of procyclicality in fertility rate. Looking
at the entire cycle, I found no significant difference between the 2000 birth/nonmarital
birth rate and the 2012 birth/nonmarital birth rate.
4. Conclusion
This paper begins with preliminary assessments that the recent housing cycle may affect
household formation decisions. Considering a consensus from literature that the 2000
housing boom is mainly resulted from changes in housing demand, I utilized the changes
in housing demand shocks to measure the size of housing booms and adopt the latest
instrument for the booms—the size of structural break in housing prices during the
housing booms—to identify the causality of housing demand shocks on labor market
conditions and household formation decision.
This paper provides empirical evidence that housing booms improve labor market
conditions for young people, and this economic security from housing booms lead to an
increase in both marriage rate and fertility rate and a lower nonmarital birth rate. The
results indicate that people in the younger age group, age 18-25, are more sensitive to
20The result is not shown.
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housing booms, and this gives us an explanation to a significant increase in marriage
rate for only 18-25-year-olds. This paper also find that during housing busts, 26-33-year-
olds have a lower lower marriage rate. The increase in fertility rate and the decrease in
nonmarital birth rate as result of the housing boom reversed during the housing bust.
The results are in concordance with the Becker’s model and empirical results from Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson (2019).
The findings in this paper add to the literature by showing the effects of housing market
fluctuation on labor market and thereby marriage and fertility decisions. These can help
policy makers to understand how young people response to housing cycles and how policy
can be formulated to support the households when they are facing economic fluctuations
especially downturns. Admittedly, why the housing boom continuously increase marriage
rate for the 18-25-year-olds during the housing bust is not fully explained in this paper.
Future research could continue to explore the possible reasons.
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CHAPTER II
HOUSEHOLD COOKING FUEL CHOICE IN INDIA, 2004-2012: A
PANEL MULTINOMIAL ANALYSIS
1. Introduction
Around 3 billion people cook using polluting open fires or simple stoves fuelled by
kerosene, biomass (wood, animal dung and crop waste) and coal (WHO, 2018).21
Using traditional fuels, such as firewood, charcoal, or agricultural waste, produces
both indoor and outdoor air pollution and threatens public health (Bruce et al.,
2000; Smith, 2000; Alem et al., 2016). Collecting traditional fuels is time-consuming,
and women and children are often responsible for this job. Thus use of traditional
fuels reduces their time for studying or doing other productive activities (Burke and
Dundas, 2015). For economic growth, it is crucial to replace traditional fuels with
modern fuels, like electricity, kerosene, or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) (Kaygusuz,
2011). Not surprisingly, the issue of household transition from traditional fuel to clean
fuel has received considerable attention from both researchers and policymakers.22 A
number of studies published over the past three decades investigate the factors driving
the transition. Muller and Yan (2018) provide a recent survey of the literature. As
argued by Muller and Yan (2018), even though some studies are merely based on
simple descriptive statistics, one can see the emergence of econometric methods to
quantify the patterns and factors of household fuel use. Majority of the existing liter-
21https://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/household-air-pollution-and-health
22Cooking fuels also have attracted increasing interest over the years because fuel wood harvesting has caused
extensive deforestation.
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ature on fuel-transition is based on cross-section data, and only recently, researchers have
used panel data to have more credible estimation strategy (Alem et al., 2016; Choumert-
Nkolo et al., 2019).
In the literature on fuel transition from traditional to clean fuel, “energy ladder model”
is quite popular (Hosier and Dowd, 1987; Leach, 1992; Leach and Mearns, 2013; Van der
Kroon et al., 2013). “Energy ladder model” states that the households would move along
the energy ladder when they receive higher income or social status. However, households
are usually unable to get rid of traditional fuels completely because of cost consideration,
culture preference, or supply side considerations (Masera et al., 2000; Alem et al., 2016).
It has been noted that multiple fuel use constitutes the rule rather than the exception
in many urban and rural areas of developing countries, and the use of multiple fuels
is described as “fuel stacking” (Heltberg, 2004; Masera et al., 2000; Ruiz-Mercado and
Masera, 2015).
In this paper, I use a nationally representative panel data from India, India Human
Development Survey (IHDS), to examine determinants of cooking fuel choice in urban
and rural India, separately. I use multi-period multinomial logit model of fuel choice that
account for unobserved time and choice invariant household heterogeneity. In addition to
the usual household characteristics and prices of different fuels, the richness of the IHDS
data allows me to control village level infrastructure, and women’s bargaining power.
Given the population size and development stage of India, interest in households’
transition from traditional to clean fuels is not new, and there exists significant literature
on this topic. However, the existing literature on India use either a single or multiple
cross-section data. Gangopadhyay et al. (2003) estimate a multinomial logit to model
household main fuel (both cooking and lighting fuels together) choice separately for rural
and urban Indian households using one round of Consumer Expenditure Survey collected
by National Sample Survey (NSS) in 1999-00. Farsi et al. (2007) also use one round of
NSS cross-section data collected in 1999-00 to examine household cooking fuel choice in
urban India. Compared to Gangopadhyay et al. (2003), they use an ordered discrete
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choice framework and focus only on cooking fuels for urban households. In comparison
to above mentioned two studies that use single round of cross-section data, Viswanathan
and Kumar (2005) and Cheng and Urpelainen (2014) use multiple rounds of NSS cross-
section data. Viswanathan and Kumar (2005) use three rounds of NSS data collected in
1983, 1993-94, and 1999-00 to descriptively document expenditure on different types of
fuel and share of clean fuel in total fuel expenditure in rural and urban India and Indian
states. Cheng and Urpelainen (2014) use two rounds of NSS data collected in 1987-88
and 2009-10, and discuss fuel-stacking behavior for lighting and cooking in India. They
use a two-stage model: in the first stage they estimate a probit model for use of any
modern fuel, while in the second stage they examine whether households engage in fuel
stacking behavior conditional on using any modern fuel. They find the stacking of LPG
and traditional biomass has grown rapidly in India over 1987 and 2010. They also find
that although the household income has a robust negative effect on cooking fuel stacking
in 1987, it has a positive effect in 2010. They speculate that with the dramatic rise in the
use of LPG in 2010, fuel stacking has become so common that even relatively wealthy
households now engage in it.
It is worth noting that the dynamic fuel stacking behavior cannot be observed in cross-
section data (Alem et al., 2016). Moreover, the covariates available in the NSS data, that
most of Indian literature on fuel choices is based on, are limited. For example, the NSS
data do not contain any information that can be used to measure the bargaining power
of the women in the household except education of individuals. Similarly information on
village infrastructure is not available in the NSS data.23
This paper contributes to existing literature in the following ways. First, unlike the
23Moreover, the NSS data report expenditure on consumption of energy (fuel, light and household appliances) during
the last 30 days. Thus it does not distinguish between cooking and lighting. Cheng and Urpelainen (2014) reduce the
dimensionality of the lighting fuel choice to that of kerosene and electricity, while focusing on liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG ) and biomass on the cooking part. While for most fuels the primary use for cooking or lighting is distinct, fuels
such as kerosene could be used for both. According to 68th round of NSS data collected in 2011-12, about 2.7 percent
of households reported kerosene as the main source of cooking while only 0.17 percent of households report electricity as
main source of cooking. The 2011 Census data suggest that 2.9 percent of the households use kerosene as main source of
cooking, while only 0.1 percent of households use electricity as main source. Nonetheless, even if kerosene might not be
the main source of cooking, it could be a supplementary source of cooking. For example, 2011 IHDS that asks whether
households use kerosene, and for what purpose, about 27 percent households responded using kerosene for either cooking
or cooking and lighting both.
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existing literature on India (Cheng and Urpelainen, 2014; Farsi et al., 2007; Viswanathan
and Kumar, 2005; and Gangopadhyay et al., 2003) that is based on cross-section NSS
data, I use a panel data and take account of household heterogeneity using a multinomial
random effects model. 24 The advantage of panel data is that it relaxes the assumption
— multiple observations within a choice are independent (Alem et al., 2016). Second,
distinct from existing literature on India, I also look at the bargaining power of women
using multiple indicators available in my data. Third, for rural households, I examine
the impact of village level infrastructure on fuel choice.
The main findings of the paper are following. First, there exist substantial differences
across urban and rural areas. The household characteristics that are positively associated
with the use of clean fuel (e.g. income, education) also increases the use of fuel stacking
in rural areas but have no significant effects in urban areas. This suggests that a clean-
break with the use of traditional fuels is unlikely to be in occurring rural areas, while more
probable in urban areas. Rural households are more likely to go through stages where
they shift to mixed fuel and later on to clean fuel. Second, I find that access to paved
road is an important determinant for rural households adopting clean fuel and distance
to the nearest town is not important. Third, I also find evidence of social spillover effects
in rural areas: households residing in villages that reported clean (dirty) fuel as their
main source are more likely to use clean (dirty) fuel and less likely to use dirty (clean)
fuel. Fourth, the bargaining power of women that is associated with economic status
(e.g. education or economic freedom) leads to increase in probability of household using
clean fuel. Fifth, I find considerable impact of LPG prices on the probability of use of
clean fuel in urban areas, but no significant impact for rural households.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the data, Section 3
provides the empirical strategy, Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
24Recently, Mekonnen and Köhlin (2009) and Alem, et al. (2016) use multinomial logit model with random effects to
study fuel choices in Ethiopia, Choumert-Nkolo et al. (2019) use multinomial logit model with random effects to study
fuel choice in Tanzania.
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2. Overview of Data
2.1. Data Description
I use two waves of large scale India Human Development Survey (IHDS) collected in
2004-05, and 2011-12 (henceforth, 2004 and 2011, respectively). The IHDS are nation-
ally representative and were collected jointly by National Council of Applied Economic
Research at Delhi and the University of Maryland (Desai et al. 2005; and Desai and
Vanneman, 2015).25 The 2011 IHDS collected information on 42,153 households (27,580
rural and 14,573 urban). Out of these 42,153 households, 40,018 households were also
surveyed in the 2005 IHDS. I use only those households that were surveyed in both
rounds. I further drop 653 households who do not report using any cooking fuel. Thus
my final data contains a balanced panel of 39,365 households (26,927 rural and 12,438
urban).
The IHDS data contain several socioeconomic information at the household and indi-
vidual level. The data have information on both household consumption and income, and
information on each type of fuel used in the households. Unlike NSS survey that asks for
main cooking fuel, IHDS contain detailed energy module where respondents were asked
detailed questions about their use of all energy sources. A separate village and women
module were also implemented as part of IHDS. The village module contains information
of village infrastructure and prices of different fuels. I use prices of different fuels at the
village level collected in village module. Since the prices were not available for urban
areas, I import district level fuel prices in urban areas from NSS 61st and 68th rounds
of consumption expenditure. The NSS 61st and 68th rounds were collected in 2004-05
and 2011-12, and overlap with sample period of IHDS. NSS data do not collect prices at
town/village or district levels, hence median prices of different types of fuels reported by
households in urban areas in a district are taken as prevailing prices in district.26
25IHDS data is publicly available from Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). See
http://ihds.info/ for more details.
26For rural sample, the IHDS data do not report price of coal, I impute price of coal for rural households using district
level coal prices from NSS rural sample. District is the lowest level of geographical unit that can be identified in both
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The women module of the IHDS was implemented to only those households that have
a residing adult women in age 18-49. The women module contains questions that I use
to assess women autonomy inside the household. I generate five variables to measure
women bargaining power. The first one is the education gap which equals to the highest
education level of female adults minus the highest education level of male adults in house-
hold. I create four additional indices that capture violence against women, involvement
in decision making, freedom of movement, and financial independence of women. The
indices are constructed by combining multiple questions available in the survey utilizing
the principal components analysis (PCA). The PCA takes into account which measures
are proxying the same concept as opposed to different concepts.
The first index, violence index, captures the magnitude of violence in the community.
It is based on following questions: In your community is it usual for husbands to beat
their wives in each of the following situations? 1) if she goes out without telling him;
2) if her natal family does not give expected money, jewelry or other items; 3) if she
neglects the house or the children; 4) if she doesn’t cook food properly; 5) if he suspects
her of having relations with other men. The second index, most say in decision-making,
captures the women’s extent of say in various decision making. The index is based on
whether women have say in following decisions : 1) what to cook on a daily basis; 2)
whether to buy an expensive item such as a TV or fridge; 3) How many children to have;
4) what to do if a child falls sick; 5) to whom children should marry.27 The third index,
financial independence index, captures the magnitude of financial freedom enjoyed by
women based on the following three questions asked to the respondent woman: 1) Do
you yourself have any cash in hand to spend on household expenditures; 2) is your name
on any bank account, 3) is your name on the ownership or rental papers for your home.28
The fourth index, permission index, captures whether female in a household have less
freedom to go out. It is constructed using the question: Do you have to ask permission
datasets for matching purposes.
27Nordman and Sharma (2016) create similar index by adding the binary responses.
28Nordman and Sharma (2016) also create a similar index by adding the binary responses in the three questions.
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of your husband or a senior family member to go to . . . 1) the local health center; 2) the
home of relatives or friends in the village/neighborhood; 3) the Kirana shop.
In my data, there are total six fuels used for cooking—firewood, dung, crop residuals,
coal/charcoal, kerosene, and LPG. IHDS questionnaire lists each fuel type and asks from
the respondent whether the household has used the fuel for cooking purposes. The use
of electricity as fuel type is not listed, however, according to 2011 Census data, only 0.10
percent of households in India listed electricity as their main cooking fuel (0.07 percent
of rural households and 0.15 percent of urban households). Figure 6 and Figure 7 present
the types of fuel used by rural and urban households, respectively. As evident from the
figures, majority of the households in rural India use firewood, while majority of urban
households use LPG. Following the literature, I treat firewood, dung, crop residuals, and
coal/charcoal as dirty fuels, while kerosene and LPG are treated as clean fuels. Figure
8 presents the fuel stacking behavior in urban and rural households. As evident, fuel
stacking is prevalent in both urban and rural areas, and importantly, the incidence of
fuel stacking has increased between 2004 and 2011 in both urban and rural India.
Although, IHDS data also contain information on total expenditure on each type of
fuel in the last 30 days, the expenditure information is available if the household bought
the fuel from the market. For households who collected their own fuel, there is no
available imputed value. This is problematic for traditional fuels as a large fraction of
rural households use traditional fuels that are either collected from own land or other
places. Moreover, since there is no quantity information on each type of fuel, it is not
possible to impute expenditure for households who do not buy traditional fuels. Hence,
I do not use information on fuel expenditure in my analysis.29
Table 10 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used in my analysis. The
explanatory variables used in the analysis include household head characteristics, house-
hold demographic characteristics including the social groups, household consumption
expenditure as a proxy for income, fuel prices of alternative fuels at the village level (for
29Choumert-Nkolo et al. (2019) construct continuous indices using the share of expenditure of each type of fuel in total
fuel expenditure.
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rural households) or at the district level (for urban households), and different variables
that capture the bargaining power of women as discussed earlier. For rural households,
I also control for village infrastructure.
Indian society has historically been characterized by a high degree of social stratifica-
tion governed by the caste system, which results in exclusion of certain groups from cer-
tain economic and social spheres. At the time of independence, the Indian Constitution
identified the disadvantaged caste and tribes in a separate schedule of the constitution as
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/STs), and extended affirmative action pro-
tection to these groups in the form of reserved seats in higher educational institutions,
in public sector jobs, and in state legislatures as well as the Indian parliament. Other
Backward Castes (OBCs) are a group of other backward castes grouped together, and the
Government of India provided reserved positions for OBCs in public sector jobs in 1993.
Muslims are the largest minority religious group in India, and according to the Govern-
ment of India (2006), their performance on many economic and education indicators is
comparable with that for SC/STs. I control for the social group by including indicators
for belonging to Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), Other Backward Castes
(OBC), or Muslim excluding non-Muslim others.
3. Empirical Framework
My analysis is based on an multinomial logit model with unobserved heterogeneity. Each
household i faces j choices of cooking fuel at time t. Each fuel choice corresponds to
certain level of utility. Household chooses the one for which the utility is the highest. In
my setting, there are three choices at each time t: only dirty fuel (j = 1), a mix of clean
and dirty fuels (j = 2), and only clean fuel (j = 3).30
Household i’s indirect utility of a choice j at the time t in a random effects context
can be specified as follows:
30In a study in Guatemala, Heltberg (2005) captures the stacking behavior of households by using three categories: only




itβj + γij + εijt, t = 1, 2; j = 1, 2, 3 (4)
where Xit is a matrix of observed explanatory variables that are expected to affect fuel
choice and βj is the choice specific parameter vector. γij and εijt are unobserved random
components, where γij is household and choice specific. At time t, household chooses
the alternative with highest utility, Vijt. Assuming that the εijt’s are all independently
distributed according to a type I extreme-value distribution, it can be shown that the
conditional probability of household i choosing the category j at time t is given by:









where only dirty fuel is chosen as base outcome, so γi1 and βi1 are normalized to zero.
If there is no unobserved heterogeneity across households: ∀j : γij = γj, Eqn (2) will
be a pooled multinomial logistic regression. As discussed in Alem et al. (2016), the
standard multinomial logit model using the pooled sample (ignoring household hetero-
geneity) assumes that households’ choices are independent, both within a choice (that
is, for multiple observations across time of the same choice) and across all alternative
choices made by the household over time. However, facing same set of choices in different
time-periods, households are more likely to make similar choices over time. The random
effects specification relaxes the assumption that multiple observations within a choice
are independent. With this model, the choice probabilities for repeated choices made
by household i share the same time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity γij, where the
household-specific effects act as a random variable that produces a correlation among
the residuals for the same household within choices, but leaves the residuals independent




4.1. Household Fuel Choices
Table 11 presents the estimates of the panel multinomial logit modelsvwith random effects
for rural and urban areas. The rural model includes additional village level characteristics
compared to the urban model. Table 11 does not include variables capturing women
bargaining power.31 As evident from Table 11, the variances of the heterogeneity terms
for both clean fuel and stacking are large and highly significant. Moreover, addition of
random effects leads to a large increase in the log likelihood value over that for a standard
pooled multinomial logit without random effects, and a likelihood ratio test rejects the
pooled multinomial in favor of random effects. 32
In Table 12, I present the average marginal effects from the random effects models
reported in Table 11. Households belonging to the disadvantaged groups SCs, STs,
and OBCs are more likely to use only dirty fuel in rural areas compared to households
belonging to non-Muslim others group. Moreover, the disadvantaged category households
are less likely to use only clean fuel or stack in rural areas compared to non-Muslim other
households. In contrast to rural areas, SC/ST households in urban area are more likely
to stack compared to non-Muslim other households. Importantly, similar to rural areas
households belonging to disadvantaged categories (SC/STs and OBCs) are more likely
to use only dirty fuel and less likely to rely on only clean fuel compared to households
belonging to non-Muslim others group.
An increase in monthly per capita consumption increases the probability of use of both
mixed and clean fuel in rural areas. Importantly, increase in consumption expenditure
leads to a larger increase in the probability of mixed fuel use than increase in probability of
only clean fuel in rural areas. As expected, increase in consumption expenditure reduces
the probability of relying only on dirty fuel in rural areas. I find slightly different results
31In all of my estimations, I control for the six region. Ideally, I would like to control a finer geographical unit such
as state (for urban sample) and districts (for rural sample). However, because of large sample size and presence of large
number of indicators lead to convergence issues in the estimation.
32Fixed effect multinomial estimates are reported in appendix Table A6, however, I do not discuss the results here.
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for urban households. While increase in consumption expenditure is associated with a
significant decrease (increase) in the probably of use of only dirty (clean) fuel, increase
in consumption expenditure reduces the use of mixed fuel marginally. It is noteworthy
that there exists substantially large difference in the use of sole fuel between rural and
urban areas. In 2011, only 69 (7) percent of rural households reported use of only dirty
(clean) fuel, while 31 (23) percent urban households reported using only dirty (clean) fuel.
Given the large differential in the use, the differences in rural-urban results regarding use
of mixed fuel support the idea that households move from dirty fuel to mixed fuel and
then to clean fuel. Many studies have studied the impact of income/consumption on
fuel choice, and findings have been mixed. My findings in rural India are similar to
Heltberg (2004, 2005) who use multiple country data and finds that with increase in
income, households tend to add modern fuels to their mix as partial rather than perfect
substitutes for traditional ones. Alem et al. (2016) suggest that households tend to
switch to a multiple fuel–use strategy as their incomes rise, for reasons that include the
reliability of supply and convenience of use of different stoves and fuel types. Hence,
supply side considerations with differential initial use levels might be driving reasons
behind differential impact of income on mixed fuel in rural areas compared to urban
areas.
Increase in household size increases the probability of fuel stacking in both urban and
rural areas, and reduces the probability of relying on only one type of fuel. Heltberg
(2004) and Alem et al. (2016) also find that larger households are more likely to be
involved in fuel stacking. A higher dependency ratio increases the probability of relying
on only dirty fuel while reducing the probability of use of any clean fuel (either clean
only or mixed). This is true both in urban and rural areas. Importantly, children are
normally involved in collecting traditional fuel. More children reduce the cost of collecting
traditional fuel; hence, increase the use of traditional dirty fuel. Households who derived
their main income through salary or trade are less (more) likely to use dirty (clean)
fuel in both urban and rural area compared to households whose main income source
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in cultivation/agriculture. Moreover, households whose main income source is salary or
trade are more likely to use mixed fuel in rural areas, while less likely to use mixed fuel
in urban areas.
Female-headed households in rural areas are less likely to use only dirty fuel and more
likely to be involved in fuel stacking behavior. In urban areas, female headed households
are more likely to rely only on clean fuel. It is important to note that the female-headed
rural households are only marginally more likely to use clean fuel, while for the urban
households the impact on the use of mixed fuel is insignificant. This suggests that females
prefer to use clean fuel, however, because of supply constraints, they move to mixed fuel
in rural areas, while they moves to clean fuel in urban areas. The existing literature also
supports the idea that the female-headed households prefer modern fuels to traditional
fuels (Farsi et al., 2007; Rao and Reddy, 2007; Rahut et al., 2014). This is generally
attributed to the fact that women are often responsible for household cooking and thus
are directly affected by the air pollution emitted from the burning of the dirty fuels. Age
of head also reduces the use of only dirty fuel and increases the probability of household
adopting clean fuel in both rural and urban areas. Muller and Yan (2018) suggest that
this result implies clean fuels is more affordable for the elderly than the young people
because the later facing liquidity constraints. The education of household head plays a
role in fuel choices. More education is associated with a decline in the probability of
relying on only dirty fuel, while increases the probability of relying only on clean fuel
in both rural and urban areas. Consistent with other results, although more education
increases the probability of fuel stacking in rural areas, it decreases the probability of
fuel stacking in urban areas.
The prices of fuels have drawn considerable attention in fuel choice literature. I find
that an increase in firewood prices reduces (increases) the probability of use of only dirty
(clean) fuel in rural areas, and has no impact on the fuel stacking behavior. In urban
areas, increase in firewood prices reduces probability of use of either only dirty fuel or
mixed fuel, while increases the probability of use of only clean fuel. Thus, households tend
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to shift to clean fuel sources as price of firewood increases. Importantly, the magnitude
of impacts of increase in firewood prices are much larger in urban areas compared to
rural areas. This is possibly because, while the households in urban areas mostly rely
on market for firewood, households in rural areas can self-collect firewood potentially
reducing the impact of an increase in firewood prices. Increase in price of coal reduces
the probability of using either clean or dirty fuel and increases the probability of use of
mixed fuel in both urban and rural areas. It is noteworthy that less than 2 percent of
rural households and close to 5 percent of urban households reported use coal for cooking.
Increase in dung prices increases the probability of using only dirty fuel, while reduces
the use of mixed fuel in rural areas. The estimates suggest that increasing dung prices
also increases the probability of use of clean fuel; however, the magnitude of impact is
marginal. Increase in use of dirty fuel with dung prices is counter-intuitive; however,
as my indicator for dirty fuel contains four types of fuel, there is a possibility of cross-
substitution. Some scholars suggest that cross-price effects can be an important driver
of fuel substitution (Muller and Yan, 2018). For example, Peng et al. (2010) show that
high coal prices increase the probability of choosing biomass in China, suggesting that
coal and biomass may be substitutes.
Increase in kerosene prices decreases the use of only dirty fuel for rural households
while increasing the probability of relying on only clean fuel or mixed fuels. For urban
households increase in kerosene prices increases the use of only clean fuel but reduces the
probability of use of dirty or mixed fuel. It is noteworthy that my clean fuel category
includes both LPG and kerosene, and cross-substitution within clean fuel group may
increase the use of clean fuel. Akpalu et al. (2011) find kerosene and LPG are substitutes.
Gupta and Kohlin (2006) using data in India suggest a high cross-price elasticity of
LPG with respect to Kerosene as well. Nonetheless, the decreased use of only dirty
fuel as a result of increase in kerosene price is puzzling. However, similar results are
reported in some other contexts. For example, Lay et al. (2013) report a statistically
significant negative effect of the kerosene price on the choice of wood in Kenya. In
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fact, kerosene prices are not considered as an effective policy instrument to trigger fuel
switching (Pitt, 1985; Lee, 2013; Akpalu et al., 2011). Interestingly, kerosene in India is
one of the subsidized commodities for household use, and been distributed by the Public
Distribution System (PDS) for decades. In other words, the actual kerosene prices faced
by the households may be different than the market prices based on the households’
eligibility for PDS and amount of PDS kerosene consumed. This introduces another
uncertainty regarding the impact of market price for kerosene on clean fuel.
Increase in the price of LPG reduces use of mixed fuel and increases the use of dirty
fuel for rural households, although the impact on dirty fuel is not statistically significant.
Nonetheless, the impact of LPG price is much stronger in urban areas compared to rural
areas, which is not surprising given a much higher incidence of LPG use in urban areas.
For urban households, one percent increase in prices leads to 13.6 percentage points
decline in use on clean fuel, and leads to a 14.3 percentage points increase in use of
only dirty fuel. This is consistent with the evidence in the fuel choice literature that
suggest a strong own-price effects for the demand of LPG (Farsi et al., 2007; Zhang and
Kotani, 2012), and a substitution relationship between LPG and firewood (Heltberg,
2004; Sehjpal et al., 2014).
The availability of modern fuel like LPG should not be a big issue for urban households,
however, it can be a key issue for rural households. Seventy eight percent of the urban
households reported using LPG in 2012; however, only 30 percent of the rural households
reported using LPG. Access to the LPG may be a contributing factor in the observed
difference in the use of LPG across urban and rural areas besides other demand side
factors. Increase in the distance to nearest town increases the use of dirty fuel and
reduces the use of mixed fuel. There is no impact on the use of only clean fuel. Whether
the village has paved road or not seems to an important determinant of fuel choice. Not
having paved road lead to 4 percentage points increase in use of dirty fuel while it reduces
the use of clean or mixed fuel. I also find evidence of social spillovers. Households residing
in villages that reported clean fuel as their main source are more likely to use clean or
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mixed fuel and less likely to use dirty fuel. Households residing in villages that reported
dirty fuel as their main cooking energy source are more likely to use dirty fuel and less
likely to use clean fuel.
4.2. Women’s Bargaining Power
Appendix Table A7 presents the results of multinomial random effects models that also
include women bargaining power33 , while Table 13 presents the average marginal im-
pacts. Note that Table 13 is similar to Table 12 except that Table 13 models also include
variables that capture the bargaining power of women. Since the bargaining information
is constructed from the women module that was implemented only if the household has
a residing adult women in age 18-49, inclusion of bargaining variables leads to loss of
significant number of observations. However, the estimates of the rest of the variables re-
main qualitatively similar to what is presented in Table 12, and discussed earlier. Hence,
I focus only on bargaining variables from the Table 13.
A greater education gap between female and male namely greater women bargaining
power in the rural households results in a lower probability to use only dirty fuel but
a higher probability to use only clean fuel and mixed fuel. The education gap makes
urban households more likely to use only clean fuel, and less likely to use either dirty
or mixed fuel. Similar findings are also reported in the Ahmad and Oliveira (2015)
for urban India and Choumert-Nkolo et al. (2019) for Tanzania. Increase in women’s
financial independence increases the probability of use of clean fuel for urban households
while reducing the probability of dirty or mixed fuels. For rural households also more
financial independence lead to increase in probability of use of mixed fuel and reduction
in probability of use of dirty fuel. The impact of financial independence on the use
of clean fuel for rural households is marginal, however, positive. My result suggests
that empowering women by education and individual finance could be effective policy
instruments to accelerate the process of fuel switching.
33The results of multinomial logit fixed effect model with women bargaining power are reported in appendix Table A8,
however, I do not discuss the results here.
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Women greater bargaining power as captured by more say in household decisions
has no significant impact on fuel choice for rural households. For urban households,
however, more say in household decision marginally increases the probability of use of
dirty fuel. A one standard deviation increase in say increases probability of use of dirty
fuel by 0.6 percentage points for urban households. Violence index, that captures the
perception of women about the amount of violence prevalent, increases the probability of
using only dirty fuel or only clean fuel, while reduces the probability of using mixed fuel
for rural households. For urban households, an increase in violence index increases the
probability of use of only clean fuel while reducing use of mixed fuel. Recall that a larger
violence index implies less bargaining power for women. Given the index is standardized,
the impact of violence index remain marginal.34 The permission index that captures
the permission needed has no significant impact on the choice of fuel. Overall, the
bargaining power of women that is associated with economic status (e.g. education or
economic freedom) leads to increase in probability of household using clean fuel.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I use two waves of India Human Development survey panel data to examine
factors determining household fuel choice in rural and urban areas, separately. Majority
of literature on fuel choice in India is based on cross-sectional data and thus does not
allow for household heterogeneity. I contribute to the existing literature on India by
using a panel data, and utilizing multinomial logit with random effects. Moreover, I also
examine the impact of village infrastructure and women bargaining power on fuel choice.
I find considerable incidence of fuel stacking where households use both clean and
dirty fuel together in both urban and rural areas. The use of only clean fuel remains
low in rural areas, and between 2004 and 2011, there is an increase in fuel stacking not
only in rural areas but also in urban areas. I find that the household characteristics
that are positively associated with use on only clean fuel, such as education, per capita
34Moreover, the violence index captures respondent woman’s perception about the status of women in the community,
and may not be capturing the intra-household bargaining power of respondent women.
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expenditure, are also positively associated with use of fuel stacking for rural households.
For urban households, these characteristics have mostly no significant impact on fuel
stacking. For rural households, I find access to paved road increases the probability of
use of clean fuel suggesting supply side considerations play a role in adoption of clean
fuel. I also find that female-headed households are more likely to adopt clean fuel, and
increasing economic freedom of women is positively association with use of clean fuel.
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CHAPTER III
IMPACTS OF CROSS-COUNTRY INFRASTRUCTURE ON
BILATERAL TRADE: EVIDENCE FROM NEW SILK ROAD
RAILWAYS
1. Introduction
Since implementing free market economic reforms in the 1970s, China has experienced
a rapid economic growth. Growing economic power has enabled China to involve in
more global economic policies and projects. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an
international trade and development strategy, proposed officially by President Xi,
Jinping of China in 2013, to improve connectivity on a trans-continental scale. The
“Belt” (Silk Road Economic Belt) links China to Central and South Asia and onward
to Europe, while the “Road” (New Maritime Silk Road) links China to the nations
of South East Asia, the Gulf Countries, North Africa, and on to Europe.
New Silk Road railways on the Belt have been being operated since 2011. These
new railway services between China and Europe are cheaper than air freights and
faster than ocean shipments. Trading times are particularly important for time sen-
sitive products that are used as inputs in production processes, suggesting that re-
ductions in shipping times are key in the presence of global value chains (Baniya,
Rocha, and Ruta, 2019). The destination countries may face greater competition
with China even though they have better access to Chinese market (Cosentino, et al.,
2018) potentially affecting both imports (exports) from (to) China. Although Silk
Road Railways in an ongoing project, as connection to more countries are introduced,
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I examine the impact of Silk Road railways on the bilateral trade of destination countries
with China focusing on the destination countries that got railways connection in different
years over 2011-2018. A major challenge in measuring causal effects of railways is that
the selection of destination countries is not random but may depend on ancient Silk
Road trading route, geopolitical goals, or China’s longer-term economic strategy, etc.
Moreover, the countries having had a tight trade relation with China may be more likely
to participate in the project. To address the issue of endogenous placement of railways,
I use the generalized synthetic control method (GSCM) proposed in Xu (2017). GSCM
is quite suitable for time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data and multiple treatment units
receiving treatment at different times.
Although there is a growing literature on entire BRI, the literature focusing on Silk
Road railways is limited.35 Li, Bolton, and Westphal (2018) use Difference-in-Difference
(DID) methodology and TSCS data from 28 countries over 2005-2014 to estimate the
impact of Silk Road railways on bilateral trade. They find that although the railway
connection does not affect the destination countries exports to China but destination
countries imports from China increased by 29.1 percent post connection. The critical
identifying assumption of DID is the “parallel trends,” which states that in the absence
of the treatment the average outcomes of treated and control units would have followed
parallel paths. This assumption is not directly testable and generally supported by
placebo that suggests parallel trend in pretreatment period. The presence of unobserved
time-varying confounders causes the failure of this assumption.
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) propose Synthetic Cohort Method (SCM)
that matches both pretreatment covariates and outcomes between a treated unit and a
set of control units and uses pretreatment periods as criteria for good matches. Specifi-
cally, it constructs a “synthetic control unit” as the counterfactual for the treated unit
by reweighting the control units. However, it only applies to the case of one treated
35There exist literature that have examined the effect of BRI on income (e.g. Maliszewska and Van Der Mensbrugghe,
2019; Bird, Lebrand, and Venables, 2019), trade (e.g. Baniya, Rocha, and Ruta, 2019; Boffa, 2018; Zhang, et al, 2018),
welfare (e.g. De Soyres, 2018), poverty and environment(e.g. Losos, 2019; Maliszewska and Van Der Mensbrugghe, 2019),
or debt to GDP ratio (e.g. Bandiera and Tsiropoulos, 2019).
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unit. Bai (2009) proposes an interactive fixed effects (IFE) strategy to model unobserved
time-varying confounders semiparametrically. IFE strategy incorporates unit specific in-
tercepts interacted with time-varying coefficients. The GSCM proposed in Xu (2017)
unifies the synthetic control method with linear IFE model. It treats counterfactuals
of treated units as missing data and makes out-of-sample predictions for posttreatment
treated outcomes based on an IFE model (Xu, 2017). Moreover, it embeds a cross-
validation scheme that selects the number of factors of the IFE model automatically.
The GSCM addresses the lack of parallel trends between control and treated units, as
it models the unobservable time-varying coefficients semi-parametrically by using the in-
teractive fixed effects (IFE) model proposed in Bai (2009). In addition to that it corrects
the bias of the IFE model when the treatment effects are heterogeneous across units
(Maamoun, 2019).
This paper adds to the literature in following ways. First, the paper adds to limited
literature on Silk Road Railways by using GSCM which provides a significant improve-
ment over existing DID estimates as discussed above. Moreover, use of GSCM allows
heterogeneous treatment effects across destination countries. Second, I use a longer pe-
riod compared to Li, Bolton, and Westphal (2018) that looks only at the initial stage of
connection. My sample include more destination countries and capture the impact over
much longer time period.
My findings are following. I do not find significant impact on either destination coun-
tries exports to China or imports from China. Moreover, I find similar results when I
look at different product category at one-digit ISO. I further divide destination countries
based on whether they share boundaries with China or not. I find similar results. Al-
though my results for exports are in accordance with results for exports presented in Li,
Bolton, and Westphal (2018), my results that suggest insignificant impact for imports
are in contrast with theirs. Their DID estimates based on data from 28 countries (7
Treated and 21 Controls) over 2005 - 2014 suggest an increase in exports post railway
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connection.36 I discuss the differences my results with theirs in results section.37
Although my results suggest that provision of railway connection did not lead to sig-
nificant change in destination countries exports (imports) to (from) China, I cannot rule
out substitution of volume between different modes of transportation. Since my analy-
sis is based on aggregated trade reported for the countries not based on transportation
method, I cannot rule out substitution across alternative modes of transportations.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provide a brief introduction of Belt
Road Railways, Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 details the empirical strategy
and Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Background: New Silk Road Railways
Belt and Road Initiative is a long-term and transcontinental investment and policy pro-
gram, which unveiled by China‘s president Xi Jinping in 2013. China has invested ex-
ceeded 100 billion U.S. dollars in the program. The purpose of BRI is to accelerate
regional integration through investment and infrastructure development. It aims at en-
hancing the connectivity of Asian, European and African continents and their adjacent
seas along Silk Road Economic Belt (Belt)38 and New Maritime Silk Road (Road). Cur-
rently, there are at least 71 participating countries.
Figure 9 shows the overall project routes: the Belt, a long-term plan of infrastructural
development, has six major land corridors (brown and orange lines), while the Road
includes one maritime corridor (the blue line). New Silk Road railways belongs to projects
of the Belt. My research interest is at the freight rail services primarily along New Eurasia
Land Bridge Economic Corridor and China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor. Until
2018, there are at least nine rail routes belongs to these two corridors.
Along New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor, the freight rails transfer prod-
36In their paper, they do not specify the number of destination countries. I assume there are 7 destination countries
based on the time line I believe.
37In essence, I replicated the DID results using the similar data as used in Li, Bolton, and Westphal (2018). I find
insignificant impacts on both exports and imports using the same sample.
38I called the “Belt” in the rest of content
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ucts made in China mainly run through Dzungarian Gate to Central Asia and Europe.
For example, the operation of the first New silk Road railway, Yuxinou, is along this
corridor. In 2011, before official BRI announcement, Yuxinou started operation from
Chongqing, China, passed through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, and arrived
in Duisburg, Germany. The railways operating along China-Mongolia-Russia Economic
Corridor mainly pass Mongolia and Russia through Manzhouli. Dzungarian Gate and
Manzhouli are the important land ports for the two corridors.
The railways of my interest mainly connect China with countries in Central Asia
and Europe, so I am going to see if the railways indeed have impacts on the destination
countries comparing to other Central Asian and European countries. The railways stop by
15 Central Asian and European countries including Mongolia. In addition to the countries
along the first rail route, the railways also arrived Czech Republic in 2012; France,
Mongolia, and Uzbekistan in 2014; Iran, Spain, and Tajikistan in 2015; Netherlands in
2016; United Kingdom and Hungary in 2018.39
3. Data
I assemble data set from various sources to construct a panel dataset for 65 European
and Central Asian countries.40 The bilateral trade data is sourced from World Integrated
Trade Solution (WITS). In addition to using aggregated bilateral trade data, I also use
bilateral trade by Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Revision 3.41 The
characteristics of countries such as export-to-GDP ratio, import-to-GDP ratio, GDP,
labor force participation, total population, average tariff, and exchange rate are taken
from World Development Indicators (WDI).42
For the connection of railways data, I define a country receiving railway connection by
39Too many missing values in the trade outcomes for Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, so these two countries are excluded in
my analysis.
40I exclude island countries except Britain which has been connected through Silk Road railways.
41I select SITC3 because trade data under SITC3 have less missing values.
42For few countries’ missing exchange rate data in WDI are substituted with data from Federal Reserve Economic Data
(FRED) and Eurostat. I replace the missing tariff data in WDI using previous or earlier years’ values since tariff may not
change in a few years.
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a given year when the first rail fright arrived between 2011 - 2018.43 The main outcome
variables are log of gross import from China and log of gross export to China.44 My main
sample include 59 countries and 13 of which are destination countries.45
Figure 10 shows the treatment and control countries over year.46 13 countries connect
with China by railways at different time period. The rest of the countries serve as
control countries. Table 14 shows summary statistics of treatment and control groups.
On average, treatment group has larger gross import and gross export and a lower tariff
rate than control group.
4. Empirical Strategy
First, I estimate the traditional DID model by estimating the following equation:
Yit = δConnectedit +X
′
itβ + θi + ηt + εit (6)
where the dependent variable Yit is the logarithm of the gross import (or gross export)
for country i from (to) China in year t. Connectedit is a binary indicator that takes a
value one after country i become a destination countries in year t. Xit is a matrix of time-
varying country characteristics: log of GDP, log of population, labor force participation
rate, log of exchange rate, average tariff rate, share of exports, imports, agriculture, and
manufacturing in GDP. θi and ηt are country and year fixed effects to capture unobserved
country-specific factor and time-variant shocks.47 εit is the idiosyncratic error term. The
parameter of interest, δ, measures the causal effect of railways on trade outcomes under
‘parallel’ trend assumption. Standard errors are clustered by country. As discussed in
introduction section, because of time-varying unobserbales, the parallel trend assumption
43There is no official guide book of New Silk Roads railways, so I refer relevant News, Baidu, Wikipedia, and Li, Bolton,
and Westphal (2018).
44Gross import/export is the sum of import/export and re-import/re-export.
45I drop 6 countries with too many missing values in outcome or control variables: Uzbekistan, Djibouti, Iraq, Libya,
Turkmenistan, and Andorra.
46The data is an unbalanced panel with a few missing values represented by white cells.
47I do not control for the time-invariant country specific variables generally used in gravity models as they will be
absorbed by country or time fixed effect. For example, the partner country (China) GDP is absorbed by year fixed effects.
Similarly, country specific variables such as sharing the same official language or border or past colonial relationship, the
strength of market penetration are absorbed by country fixed effects.
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may not hold. To allow for the possibility of parallel trend assumption not holding, I
estimate Generalized Synthetic Control Analysis (GSCM) proposed in Xu (2017).
4.1. Generalized Synthetic Control Analysis
Following the framework and notations in Xu (2017), let τ and C denote the sets of
treatment and control units, respectively. Nτ and NC are the numbers of treatment and
control units, so the total number of units, is N = Nτ + NC . All units are observed for
T periods. Assume T0 be the number of pre-treatment periods. The outcome variable
Yit can be expressed in the following functional form:




ift + εit (7)
where δit is the heterogeneous treatment effect for country i in year t. ft is an (r × 1)
vector of unobserved common factors while λi is an (r × 1) vector of unknown factor
loadings representing country specific intercepts. εit represents unobserved idiosyncratic
shocks for country i in year t.
Based on the aforementioned functional form, Yit(1) and Yit(0), the potential outcomes
for country i in treatment years or in pre-treatment years, respectively, can be expressed
by the following equations:









ift + εit. (9)
This treatment effect is captured by δit
δit = Yit(1)− Yit(0), t > T0 (10)
Stacking all control units together, I have:
Yco = Xcoβ + FΛ
′
co + εco (11)
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where Yco = [Y1, Y2, ..., YNco ] and εco = [ε1, ε2, ..., εNco ] are T ×Nco matrices. Xco is a three-
dimensional (T×Nco×p) matrix, and Λco == [λ1, λ2, ..., λNco ]′ is a (Nco×r) matrix, X ′coβ
and FΛ′C are also T ×Nco matrices. As discussed in Xu (2017), to identify β, F,Λco, two
sets of constraints on the factors and factor loadings are needed: all factor are normalized,
and they are orthogonal to each other, i.e.: F ′F/T = Ir and Λ
′
coΛco =diagonal. The
number of factor, r, is chosen by a cross-validation procedure as described in Xu (2017).
The main aim of the GSCM is to find the effect of the treatment by finding the average
difference between the treated unit(s) and its counterfactual. The average treatment












Yit(1) is observable for treated countries in post-treatment periods, but Yit(0) is missing.
To construct treated counterfactuals for each treated countries in the post-treatment
period, I first have to estimate β̂, F̂ , and Λ̂co:




(Yi −Xiβ̃ − F̃ Λ̃i)′(Yi −Xiβ̃ − F̃ Λ̃i)
s.t. F̃ ′F̃ /T = Ir and Λ̃C
′
Λ̃C = diagonal.
The second step estimates factor loadings for each treated country by minimizing the
mean squared error of the predicted treated outcome in the pre-treatment periods:
λ̂i = argmin
λ̂i





(Y 0i −X0i β̂), i ∈ τ,
where β̂ and F̂ 0 are estimated by the first step, and the superscripts “0”s denote the







f̂t, i ∈ τ, t < T0.
Hence, the ATT estimator can be obtained: ÂTTt = (1/Ntr)
∑
i∈τ [Yit(1) − Ŷit(0)] for
t > T0.
5. Results
5.1. Estimates of Difference-in-Difference Model
Column (1) of Table 15, presents the DID estimate for gross import when covariates
are not controlled for. Although the DID estimate suggest positive impact of railways
on destination countries imports from China, I cannot rule out no impact. Importantly,
when I control for country time-varying characteristics in column (2) of Table 15,, the
sign of DID estimate flips, though the DID estimate remains statistically insignificant. In
column (3) of Table 15, I also control for country-specific linear time trends that allow
each country to follow differential trend. The sign of DID flips positive again. Although
the DID estimate remains insignificant in all specifications, the estimate switching signs
create uncertainty about the direction of impact if any.
In column(1)-(3) of Table 16, I present similar DID results for gross exports of desti-
nation countries to China. The DID estimate without controls in column (1) presents a
negative but insignificant impact of the railways on gross exports. The DID estimate in
column (2) of Table 16 that controls for country characteristics suggest that the railway
connection lead to a significant decline in destination countries gross exports to China.
However, when I allow for differential trends in column (3) of Table 16, the DID estimate
turns positive, although statistically significant.
Thus, based on DID estimates, I conclude that the connection of silk railway did not
lead to a significant impact of destination countries imports from China. In terms of
exports to China also, I do not find conclusive evidence of impact. These results are in
contrast to the DID results presented in Li, Bolton, and Westphal (2018). They present
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the DID specifications which is similar to my column (2) specification that imposes similar
trend across countries. They use a panel data from 28 countries over 2005-2014 that
include 7 treated countries. They report no significant impact on destination counties
exports to china, however, a significant increase in imports from China. As discussed
earlier following a similar specification reported in column (2) of Table 15 and Table 16, I
do not find statistically significant impact on imports, while a negative impact on exports.
To reconcile the differences in DID estimates, I re-estimate restricting my sample similar
to theirs. However, I could not replicate their results and find results which are similar
to my full sample results.48
5.2. Estimates of Generalized Synthetic Control Method
The two-way fixed effects model referred as DID presented in earlier section assumes a
constant treatment effect both across countries and over time. Next, I apply the GSCM
to examine how the railways affect bilateral trade. The results of GSC estimation on gross
import and gross export are presented in the column (4) and (5) of Table 15 and Table 16,
respectively. First, I look into the effect of railways on gross import through a simple GSC
model without controlling for country characteristics. In column (4), no characteristics
are controlled for, while in column (5) characteristics are controlled for. Similar to DID,
both these specifications impose additive state and year fixed effects. In the column (4)
of Table 15, the GSCM estimate suggest that railway connection led to decline in imports
from China. Controlling for characteristics in column (5) strengthens the magnitude of
the impact, however, the GSCM estimate remain statistical insignificant at conventional
level (p-value=0.058). The cross validation scheme in column (5) finds one unobserved
factor to be important and after conditioning on the unobserved factor and additive
fixed effects, the estimated ATT based on the GSCM suggests a 19 percent reduction
in imports in the BRI countries as compared to the counterfactual that represents the
48The replicated results are available from the corresponding author. It is worth pointing out that in Table 3 and Table
5 of Li, Bolton, and Westphal (2018), the authors have reported controlling country and year fixed effects. However,
they also report coefficient for country-specific time-invariant variables such as whether country is landlocked or not and
distance, and year-specific variable e.g. Chinese GDP.
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would-have-been scenario in the absence of the railway connection.49
In Figure 11a, I plot the actual import data of destination countries against the coun-
terfactual generated through GSCM. As observed, the counterfactual is indistinguishable
from treatment group in pre-treatment period suggesting that treated group should be
exhibiting similar pattern as counterfactual in post-treatment period in the absence of
treatment. Figure 11b demonstrate the impact of railway connection up to 5 periods
after connection. Although the estimates suggest a negative impact on imports, I can-
not rule out no impact as the confidence intervals include zero. Similarly, I do not find
statistically significant impact on exports of destination countries (column (4) of Table
16). In Figure 12a, I plot the export of treated group and counterfactual to demonstrate
that GSCM counterfactual mimic the treated group in pre-treatment period. Figure 12b
plots the impact of railway up to 5 periods post-treatment, and suggest no significant
impact on exports.
To check robustness of baseline GSC estimates, I also employ the matrix completion
(MC) method proposed in Athey et al. (2017). Distinct from GSCM that using uses
information from control units, MC method utilizes both control and treatment group
information in the pre-treatment period to construct the counterfactuals of treated unit.
The results for gross import and gross export are shown in the Appendix figures, Fig-
ure A7 and Figure A8. I do not find significant impact of railway connection on destina-
tion countries import from China. However, the MC method suggests negative impact
on exports after couple of periods post-treatment.
5.3. The Effect of New Silk Road Railways on Trade by Classification of the
Commodities and Destination Countries
In this section, I first explore heterogeneity in the effect of railways on trade by distinct
product categories. For example, China is the world’s largest manufacturer, so the rail-
ways may help to export its manufacturing products. I examine the outcomes for six
49Based on Xu (2017) the unobservable factors found are not directly interpretable. The one factor in my case may
simply refer to a time trend that has a heterogeneous effect on the different countries (Maamoun, 2019).
48
product categories as a result of too many missing values in other categories of outcomes.
Figure A9 and Figure A10 shows the effect of railway connection on gross import and
export of the following product categories: food and live animals (SITC 0), crude mate-
rials (SITC 2), chemicals and related products (SITC 5), manufactured good (SITC 6),
machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7), and miscellaneous manufactured articles
(SITC 8). I do not find significant impact of railways on exports and imports of different
product groups.
I further explore impact of railways based on dividing treated countries in two groups:
countries that share boundary with China vs countries that do not share boundary with
China. The results are shown in Figure A11 to Figure A14. I do not find impacts to
vary based on location of treatment countries.50
6. Conclusion
New Silk Road railways, one of the projects under Belt and Road Initiatives, have been
operational since 2011 and connect China to countries in Europe and Central Asia. Over
time more countries got connected through railways. I examine, the impact of silk road
railways on destination countries exports (and imports) to (from) China using generalized
synthetic control method (GSCM). Given the time-series cross-section nature of data and
different countries receiving treatment on different years, GSCM is suitable methodology
that account for endogenous placement of treatment.
I do not find significant impact of railway connection on either destination countries
exports to China or destination countries imports from China. My findings of no sig-
nificant impacts on bilateral trades are striking given the amount of investment in Silk
Road railways. However, there are many caveats with my study. First, given the trade
data availability till 2018 and many countries having received railways only few years
before 2018, my estimates capture only impacts for few years post railway connection.
Given the long-term nature of investment, it may take time for effects to be material-
50I also examine the effect of railway connection on each destination countries, which are plotted in Figure A15 and
Figure A16. Again, I do not find significant impact on each treated country bilateral trade with China.
49
ized. Second, since trade data for countries are not reported by means of transportation,
I cannot rule out substitution across different modes of transportation. Moreover, the
control countries may participate in the BRI project through New Maritime Silk Road
reducing the impact of Silk Road railway on treated countries.
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Figures
Figure 1: Share of Married People Age 18-25 and 26-33 by Gender, 1980-2013
Notes: This figure reports the married share of men and women age 18-25 and 26-33 during 1980-2013. The series
are generated by the CPS survey using CPS person weight.The dashed line is the predicted marriage rate based on
linear trend and it is fit to the 1980-1996 period
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Figure 2: Share of Married People by Birth Cohort and MSA Housing Price Growth
Notes: This figure shows the marriage rate of people born between 1965 to 1987, which constructed by the 1990 and
2000 Censuses data and 2005-2013 ACS data. The sample is restricted to people age 25 to 54 in the survey year. The
red-triangle line reports the marriage rate of people living in the MSAs belonging to the top tercile of housing price
growth during 2000-2006. The blue-circle line is the marriage rate of people in the MSAs belonging to the relative
bottom two terciles.
Figure 3: Fertility Rate by Birth Cohort and MSA Housing Price Growth
Notes: This figure shows the birth rate of people born between 1965 to 1987, which constructed by the 1990-2013
Vital Statistic data from NCHS. The sample is restricted to people age 25 to 48 in data year whose occurrence place
is their residential place. The red-triangle line reports the fertility rate of people living in the MSAs at the top
tercile of housing price growth during 2000-2006. The blue-circle line is the fertility rate of people in the MSAs with
lower-tercile housing prices growth.
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Figure 4: Nonmarital Birth Rate by Birth Cohort and MSA Housing Price Growth
Notes: This figure shows the nonmarital birth rate of people born between 1965 to 1987, which constructed by
the 1990-2013 Vital Statistic data from NCHS. The sample is restricted to people age 25 to 48 in data year whose
occurrence place is their residential place. The red-triangle line reports the nonmarital birth rate of people living in
the MSAs at the top tercile of housing price growth during 2000-2006. The blue-circle line is the nonmarital birth
rate of people in the MSAs with lower-tercile housing prices growth.
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Panel A. Change in marriage rate, 1990-1995 Panel B. Marriage rate, 1990
Panel C. Change in fertility rate, 1990-1995 Panel D. Fertility rate, 1990
Panel E. Change in nonmarital birth rate, 1990-1995
Panel F. Nonmarital birth rate, 1990
Figure 5: Correlation between Structure Break Instrument and Pre-period Variables
62
Figure 6: Types of Fuel Used by Rural Households by Survey Year
Figure 7: Types of Fuel Used by Urban Households by Survey Year
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Figure 8: Fuel Stacking by Region and Survey Year
Figure 9: A Blueprint of the Belt and Road Initiative
Source: Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC) Research.
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Figure 10: Data Structure of Gross Import
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(a) Treated and Counterfactual Averages: Gross Import
(b) Estimated ATT: Gross Import
Figure 11: The Effect of Railways on Gross Import by GSCM
Notes: The figure presents GSC estimates of the effect of New Silk Road Railways on gross import, which estimated
by the baseline GSC model. Covariates, state and year fixed effects are included. In part (b), the confidence intervals
are generated by block bootstrap of 1,000 times. The cross-validation scheme finds one unobserved factor.
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(a) Treated and Counterfactual Averages: Gross Export
(b) Estimated ATT: Gross Export
Figure 12: The Effect of Railways on Gross Import by GSCM
Notes: The figure presents GSC estimates of the effect of New Silk Road Railways on gross export. Covariates, state
and year fixed effects are included. In part (b), the confidence intervals are generated by block bootstrap of 1,000
times. The cross-validation scheme finds three unobserved factors.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of 2000-2006 changes by MSA
Percentiles
Variable N Mean SD 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Source
Housing demand shock: 275 0.507 0.464 -0.089 0.158 0.494 0.822 1.085
Change in housing prices 275 0.347 0.252 0.059 0.125 0.310 0.576 0.719 FHFA
Change in housing permits 275 0.160 0.302 -0.243 -0.028 0.154 0.328 0.524 Charles et al. (2018)
Structure Break 275 0.048 0.067 -0.03 -0.010 0.038 0.094 0.133
Log of the age 18-55 population 275 13.732 1.391 11.831 12.673 13.697 14.808 15.752 ACS/Census
Female employment rate 275 0.694 0.052 0.638 0.661 0.689 0.727 0.755 ACS/Census
Employed with a college degree 275 0.218 0.066 0.133 0.175 0.214 0.265 0.309 ACS/Census
Foreign born share 275 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.013 ACS/Census
Change in employment rate:
Age 18-25 275 -0.027 0.030 -0.059 -0.049 -0.033 -0.010 0.013 ACS/Census
Age 26-33 275 0.003 0.025 -0.026 -0.012 0.003 0.019 0.028 ACS/Census
Change in average wage
Age 18-25 275 -0.011 0.056 -0.073 -0.038 -0.009 0.013 0.055 ACS/Census
Age 26-33 275 0.047 0.048 -0.006 0.017 0.036 0.081 0.100 ACS/Census
Change in marriage rate:
Age 18-25 275 -0.040 0.021 -0.066 -0.048 -0.038 -0.028 -0.021 ACS/Census
Age 26-33 275 -0.065 0.027 -0.096 -0.076 -0.067 -0.051 -0.034 ACS/Census
Change in fertility rate:
Age 18-25 235 -0.021 0.02 -0.036 -0.026 -0.018 -0.011 -0.007 Vital Statistics
Age 26-33 235 -0.022 0.02 -0.038 -0.03 -0.022 -0.013 0.004 Vital Statistics
Change in nonmarital birth:
Age 18-25 235 0.098 0.04 0.057 0.077 0.095 0.126 0.142 Vital Statistics
Age 26-33 235 0.087 0.03 0.051 0.064 0.092 0.103 0.125 Vital Statistics
This is the summary statistic of the baseline sample at the MSA level. All of reported sample statistics are weighted by
the 2000 population age 18-33 in the MSA.
Table 2: First-Stage Estimates
Dependent variable Housing demand shock
Magnitude of structure break 3.833***
(0.318)
Log of the age 18-55 population 0.006
(0.019)
Female employment rate -3.657***
(0.410)
Employed with a college degree 1.525***
(0.415)






Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
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Table 3: Housing Booms and Labor Market Outcomes
Dependent variable: 2000-2006 change in Emp. Rate Avg. wage Emp. Rate Avg. wage
People Age 18-25 People Age 26-33
Panel A. OLS estimates
All people
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.022*** 0.064*** 0.015*** 0.034***
(0.006) (0.014) (0.005) (0.010)
R2 0.331 0.255 0.326 0.243
Men
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.025*** 0.081*** 0.022** 0.042***
(0.007) (0.018) (0.008) (0.011)
R2 0.235 0.267 0.206 0.201
Women
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.033*** 0.040*** 0.004 0.018
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011)
R2 0.104 0.067 0.041 0.144
Panel B. 2SLS estimates
All people
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.030*** 0.080*** 0.019** 0.026
(0.009) (0.016) (0.008) (0.020)
Men
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.036*** 0.107*** 0.021* 0.033
(0.012) (0.022) (0.011) (0.022)
Women
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.041*** 0.032** 0.019 0.007
(0.015) (0.014) (0.030) (0.018)
First stage F-statistic 48.940 48.940 48.940 48.940
Obs. 275 275 275 275
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Housing Booms and Marriage Outcomes: 2SLS Estimates, ACS/Census Data
Dependent variable: 2000-2006 change in share Married Cohabitating Divorce Never married Married
Panel A. 2SLS estimates for people age 18-25
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.016* 0.001 0.001 -0.011 0.016*
(0.008) (0.004) (0.001) (0.011) (0.008)
Average for people age 18-25 in 2000 0.147 0.090 0.014 0.710 0.147
Average for people age 18-25 in 2006 0.108 0.087 0.010 0.762 0.108
Panel B. 2SLS estimates for men age 18-25
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.018** 0.000 0.002* -0.015 0.018**
(0.008) (0.004) (0.001) (0.010) (0.008)
Average for men age 18-25 in 2000 0.113 0.078 0.010 0.767 0.113
Average for men age 18-25 in 2006 0.084 0.075 0.007 0.809 0.084
Panel C. 2SLS estimates for women age 18-25
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.013 0.001 0.000 -0.004 0.013
(0.010) (0.006) (0.002) (0.012) (0.009)
Average for women age 18-25 in 2000 0.181 0.102 0.018 0.654 0.181
Average for women age 18-25 in 2006 0.131 0.100 0.014 0.714 0.131
Panel D. 2SLS estimates for people age 26-33
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.005 -0.009 0.001 0.001 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007)
Average for people age 26-33 in 2000 0.518 0.097 0.066 0.265 0.518
Average for people age 26-33 in 2006 0.452 0.111 0.056 0.321 0.452
First stage F-statistic 48.940 48.940 48.940 48.940 48.940
Obs. 275 275 275 275 275
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ownership rate No No No No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Placebo Tests of Housing Booms and Marriage Rate: 2SLS Estimates, CPS Data
Dependent variable: 1990-1996 change in Marriage rate
Panel A. 2SLS estimates for people age 18-25 26-33 18-33
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.024 -0.030 -0.013
(0.033) (0.033) (0.030)
Average level ar start of period 0.208 0.574 0.407
Panel B. 2SLS estimates for men age
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.024 -0.053 -0.028
(0.031) (0.045) (0.036)
Average level ar start of period 0.159 0.543 0.367
Panel C. 2SLS estimates for women age
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.024 -0.000 0.006
(0.040) (0.036) (0.032)
Average level ar start of period 0.257 0.61 0.448
First stage F-statistic 45.860 45.860 45.860
Obs. 192 192 192
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
Table 7: Placebo Tests of Housing Booms and Fertility Rate: 2SLS Estimates
Dependent variable: 1990-1996 change in Fertility rate Nonmarital birth rate
Panel A. 2SLS estimates for people age 18-25
Housing demand change 2000-2006 -0.003 -0.068
(0.005) (0.049)
Average level ar start of period 0.106 0.417
Panel B. 2SLS estimates for people age 26-33
Housing demand change 2000-2006 -0.008*** -0.013
(0.002) (0.020)
Average level ar start of period 0.103 0.145
Panel C. 2SLS estimates for people age 18-33
Housing demand change 2000-2006 -0.006** -0.041
(0.003) (0.035)
Average level ar start of period 0.104 0.271
First stage F-statistic 44.096 44.096
Obs. 233 233
Baseline controls Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
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Table 8: Housing Busts and Marriage Rate: 2SLS Estimates
Dependent variable: change in Marriage rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. 2SLS estimates 2006-2012 2006-2009 2009-2012 2008-2012 2000-2012
All people age 18-25
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.015*** 0.008 0.007 0.009* 0.031***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011)
Men age 18-25
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.015*** 0.008* 0.007 0.009 0.033***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011)
Women age 18-25
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.016** 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.029**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012)
Panel B. 2SLS estimates
All people age 26-33
Housing demand change 2000-2006 -0.021 -0.007 -0.013 -0.017 -0.016
(0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Men age 26-33
Housing demand change 2000-2006 -0.015 -0.003 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013
(0.019) (0.011) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016)
Women age 26-33
Housing demand change 2000-2006 -0.026*** -0.011 -0.015* -0.022*** -0.018**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
First stage F-statistic 48.940 48.940 48.940 48.940 48.940
Obs. 275 275 275 275 275
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
Table 9: Housing Busts and Fertility Rate: 2SLS Estimates
Dependent variable: change in Birth rate Nonmarital birth rate
Panel A. 2SLS estimates for women age 18-25 2006-2012 2000-2012 2006-2012 2000-2012
Housing demand change 2000-2006 -0.007 0.018 0.012 -0.042
(0.004) (0.012) (0.019) (0.038)
Panel B. 2SLS estimates for women age 26-33
Housing demand change 2000-2006 -0.005*** 0.023* 0.017** -0.011
(0.002) (0.012) (0.008) (0.021)
First stage F-statistic 46.055 46.055 46.055 46.055
Obs. 235 235 235 235
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
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Table 10: Summary Statistics
Rural Urban
2004 2011 2004 2011
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Fuel use
Firewood 0.906 0.292 0.884 0.320 0.398 0.489 0.381 0.486
Dung 0.509 0.500 0.536 0.499 0.168 0.374 0.147 0.354
Crop 0.184 0.387 0.293 0.455 0.026 0.158 0.030 0.170
Kerosene 0.255 0.436 0.267 0.442 0.283 0.450 0.299 0.458
LPG 0.210 0.408 0.298 0.458 0.684 0.465 0.781 0.414
Coal 0.026 0.160 0.017 0.130 0.081 0.274 0.061 0.238
Fuel choices
Only Dirty Fuel 0.766 0.423 0.688 0.463 0.247 0.432 0.173 0.379
Only Clean Fuel 0.046 0.209 0.069 0.253 0.543 0.498 0.573 0.495
Mixed 0.188 0.391 0.243 0.429 0.210 0.407 0.254 0.435
Household characteristics
Scheduled Caste/Tribes (SC/ST) 0.332 0.471 0.343 0.475 0.211 0.408 0.218 0.413
Muslim 0.092 0.290 0.091 0.288 0.149 0.356 0.162 0.368
Other Backward Class (OBC) 0.360 0.480 0.358 0.480 0.314 0.464 0.306 0.461
Household size 6.524 3.163 5.470 2.296 5.787 2.637 5.226 2.195
Dependency ratio 0.788 0.625 0.758 0.586 0.656 0.579 0.596 0.518
Main income source: salary 0.121 0.326 0.125 0.331 0.400 0.490 0.404 0.491
Main income source: non-agriculture wage 0.164 0.370 0.234 0.424 0.214 0.410 0.240 0.427
Main income source: trade 0.103 0.303 0.088 0.284 0.298 0.458 0.278 0.448
Log real per capita expenditure 6.345 0.628 6.613 0.621 6.774 0.636 7.091 0.658
Female head 0.040 0.195 0.057 0.232 0.056 0.230 0.080 0.272
Age of head 46.906 12.936 47.725 12.873 45.867 12.282 49.051 11.967
Head’s years of education 4.358 4.375 4.944 4.562 7.492 4.867 7.891 4.860
Fuel prices
Log firewood price 0.311 0.742 1.194 0.676 0.394 0.348 1.187 0.379
Log coal price 0.011 1.160 0.999 0.971 0.717 1.354 1.693 1.173
Log dung price 0.206 0.927 0.513 0.836
Log kerosene price 2.635 0.350 3.460 0.240 2.823 0.216 3.379 0.266
Log LPG price 5.755 0.209 6.086 0.133 5.696 0.038 6.030 0.059
Village level variables
Nearest town distance (km) 14.007 10.639 13.927 11.194
Village has no paved road 0.327 0.469 0.136 0.343
Percentage of households electrified 68.569 32.910 79.057 26.637
Village main fuel is clean 0.060 0.238 0.154 0.361
Village main fuel is biomass 0.169 0.375 0.846 0.361
Women bargaining power
Education gap -2.814 4.392 -2.465 4.755 -2.025 4.329 -1.505 4.476
Violence index 0.099 1.022 0.055 0.995 -0.166 0.948 -0.126 0.997
Most say in decision making -0.111 0.886 -0.108 0.896 0.092 0.997 -0.010 0.976
Financial independence -0.078 0.947 -0.084 0.964 0.227 1.070 0.136 1.007
Permission needed index 0.089 0.936 0.079 0.924 -0.121 1.057 0.006 1.021
Sample size 27,679 26,779 10,961 11,861
74
Table 11: Multinomial Logit with Random Effects for Fuel Choice, Rural and Urban Households
Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Clean only Mixed Clean only Mixed
SC/ST -1.714*** -1.482*** -2.332*** -1.217***
(0.096) (0.061) (0.139) (0.121)
Muslim -0.485*** -0.372*** -1.863*** -0.949***
(0.126) (0.078) (0.146) (0.127)
Other Backward Class (OBC) -0.903*** -0.829*** -1.447*** -0.888***
(0.081) (0.054) (0.125) (0.113)
Household size 0.057*** 0.156*** 0.072*** 0.187***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.017) (0.015)
Deopendency ratio -0.194*** -0.285*** -0.231*** -0.174***
(0.057) (0.034) (0.065) (0.056)
Main income source: salary 2.101*** 1.225*** 2.072*** 0.886***
(0.083) (0.055) (0.130) (0.111)
Main income source: non-agriculture wage 0.431*** -0.017 0.282** -0.047
(0.099) (0.054) (0.126) (0.102)
Main income source: trade 2.077*** 0.944*** 1.667*** 0.372***
(0.093) (0.063) (0.130) (0.111)
Log real per capita consumption expenditure 1.645*** 1.271*** 2.125*** 1.240***
(0.055) (0.036) (0.079) (0.072)
Female head 0.457*** 0.504*** 0.542*** 0.250**
(0.100) (0.062) (0.116) (0.101)
Age of head 0.029*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Head’s years of education 0.244*** 0.176*** 0.309*** 0.161***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.011) (0.010)
Log firewood price 0.191*** 0.056** 1.073*** -0.150
(0.041) (0.025) (0.117) (0.102)
Log coal price -0.070** 0.107*** -0.075** 0.269***
(0.028) (0.017) (0.029) (0.027)
Log dung price -0.126*** -0.305***
(0.030) (0.020)
Log kerosene price 0.585*** 0.518*** 1.546*** 0.411***
(0.100) (0.065) (0.175) (0.151)
Log LPG price 0.206 -0.262** -2.359*** -1.537**
(0.261) (0.111) (0.767) (0.686)
Nearest town distance (km) -0.007** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.002)
Village has no paved road -0.727*** -0.423***
(0.092) (0.050)
Percentage of households electrified 0.019*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.001)
Village main fuel is clean 1.317*** 0.864***
(0.100) (0.069)
Village main fuel is biomass -0.425*** -0.134**
(0.093) (0.058)
Constant -22.040*** -12.881*** -6.935 -2.101
(1.583) (0.719) (4.432) (3.963)
Biomass fuel only is base category. Standard errors in parentheses.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
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Table 11: Multinomial Logit with Random Effects for Fuel Choice, Rural and Urban Households (Cont.)
Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4)








Region controls Yes Yes
Year controls Yes Yes
Log likelihood -25639.121 -15117.697
Observations 52,409 21,911
Biomass fuel only is base category. Standard errors in parentheses.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
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Table 12: Average Marginal Effects of Multinomial Logit with Random Effects
Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dirty Only Clean Only Mixed Dirty Only Clean Only Mixed
SC/ST 0.132*** -0.029*** -0.104*** 0.129*** -0.156*** 0.027***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Muslim 0.034*** -0.009** -0.025*** 0.102*** -0.126*** 0.025**
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Other Backward Class (OBC) 0.073*** -0.014*** -0.059*** 0.086*** -0.087*** 0.002
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Household size -0.012*** -0.001*** 0.013*** -0.010*** -0.006*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Deopendency ratio 0.024*** -0.001 -0.023*** 0.015*** -0.012** -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Main income source: salary -0.119*** 0.048*** 0.071*** -0.106*** 0.153*** -0.047***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Main income source: non-agriculture wage -0.005 0.015*** -0.011** -0.007 0.033*** -0.026**
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010)
Main income source: trade -0.098*** 0.053*** 0.045*** -0.070*** 0.147*** -0.077***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010)
Log real per capita consumption expenditure -0.116*** 0.031*** 0.085*** -0.123*** 0.133*** -0.010*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Female head -0.043*** 0.005* 0.038*** -0.028*** 0.039*** -0.010
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Age of head -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.002*** -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head’s years of education -0.016*** 0.005*** 0.011*** -0.017*** 0.021*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log firewood price -0.007*** 0.005*** 0.001 -0.028*** 0.123*** -0.094***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
Log coal price -0.007*** -0.005*** 0.011*** -0.009*** -0.027*** 0.036***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log dung price 0.024*** 0.002** -0.026***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Log kerosene price -0.046*** 0.010*** 0.037*** -0.068*** 0.132*** -0.064***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Log LPG price 0.016* 0.013 -0.029*** 0.143*** -0.136** -0.007
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.050) (0.058) (0.057)
Nearest town distance (km) 0.001*** -0.000 -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Village has no paved road 0.041*** -0.017*** -0.025***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Percentage of households electrified -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Village main fuel is clean -0.082*** 0.028*** 0.054***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
Village main fuel is biomass 0.016*** -0.012*** -0.004
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Regional controls Yes Yes
Year controls Yes Yes
Observations 52,409 21,911
Standard errors in parentheses.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
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Table 13: Average Marginal Effects of the Multinomial Random Effects with Women Bargaining
Power
Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dirty Only Clean Only Mixed Dirty Only Clean Only Mixed
SC/ST 0.114*** -0.021*** -0.093*** 0.103*** -0.136*** 0.033***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Muslim 0.005 0.001 -0.007 0.080*** -0.107*** 0.027**
(0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Other Backward Class (OBC) 0.054*** -0.011*** -0.043*** 0.070*** -0.074*** 0.004
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Household size -0.009*** -0.001** 0.010*** -0.006*** -0.009*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Deopendency ratio 0.027*** 0.000 -0.027*** 0.015*** -0.006 -0.009
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Main income source: salary -0.117*** 0.047*** 0.070*** -0.115*** 0.164*** -0.049***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
Main income source: non-agriculture wage -0.006 0.011*** -0.005 -0.008 0.049*** -0.041***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
Main income source: trade -0.092*** 0.052*** 0.039*** -0.073*** 0.150*** -0.077***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
Log real per capita consumption expenditure -0.118*** 0.031*** 0.086*** -0.117*** 0.130*** -0.013**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Female head -0.053*** 0.010** 0.043*** -0.054*** 0.065*** -0.011
(0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Age of head -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.002*** -0.002*** 0.002*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head’s years of education -0.018*** 0.005*** 0.012*** -0.017*** 0.021*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log firewood price -0.006** 0.005*** 0.001 -0.032*** 0.129*** -0.096***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Log coal price -0.008*** -0.004*** 0.011*** -0.011*** -0.028*** 0.039***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Log dung price 0.028*** 0.002** -0.030***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Log kerosene price -0.051*** 0.011*** 0.040*** -0.064*** 0.144*** -0.081***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
Log LPG price 0.020* 0.003 -0.023* 0.243*** -0.238*** -0.005
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.058) (0.067) (0.068)
Nearest town distance (km) 0.001*** -0.000 -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Village has no paved road 0.037*** -0.018*** -0.020***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Percentage of households electrified -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Village main fuel is clean -0.072*** 0.027*** 0.045***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Village main fuel is biomass 0.031*** -0.012*** -0.019***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Education gap -0.007*** 0.002*** 0.005*** -0.006*** 0.008*** -0.002**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Financial independence -0.018*** 0.004*** 0.014*** -0.024*** 0.034*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Most say in decition making -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.006** 0.001 -0.008**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Violence 0.009*** 0.004*** -0.013*** -0.001 0.010*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Permission Index -0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.004 0.006* -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Regional controls Yes Yes
Year controls Yes Yes
Observations 36,074 15,455
Standard errors in parentheses.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
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Table 14: Summary Statistics, 2000-2018
N Mean SD Min Max
Treatment group
Log of Gross export 236 21.840 1.721 17.520 25.430
Log of Gross import 235 22.880 1.736 17.540 25.570
Log of exchange rate 236 0.287 3.065 -4.548 8.500
Manufacturing/GDP 234 0.152 0.051 0.054 0.286
Agriculture/GDP 236 0.043 0.042 0.006 0.274
Labor force participation rate 236 0.596 0.071 0.371 0.821
Imp/GDP 236 0.441 0.188 0.176 0.811
Exp/GDP 236 0.463 0.191 0.193 0.880
Log of total population 236 17.140 1.060 14.690 18.800
Tariff rate 232 0.037 0.039 0.013 0.227
Log of GDP at 2010 USD 236 26.820 1.681 22.070 29.000
Control group
Log of Gross export 814 19.050 2.626 6.922 24.130
Log of Gross import 814 20.910 1.714 13.990 24.570
Log of exchange rate 817 -0.557 1.978 -3.335 5.503
Manufacturing/GDP 804 0.154 0.131 0.037 1.615
Agriculture/GDP 805 0.058 0.057 0.001 0.345
Labor force participation rate 817 0.565 0.108 0.148 0.918
Imp/GDP 801 0.506 0.229 0.143 1.872
Exp/GDP 801 0.481 0.269 0.099 2.212
Log of total population 817 15.720 1.146 12.990 18.400
Tariff rate 802 0.040 0.040 0.003 0.271
Log of GDP at 2010 USD 817 25.080 1.503 21.890 28.440
79
Table 15: Regression Estimates of Railways on Gross Import
FE GSC
Dep: log of gross import (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Railway connection 0.041 -0.029 0.051 -0.134 -0.199*
(0.149) (0.095) (0.046) (0.118) (0.115)
Log of GDP at 2010 USD 1.690*** 1.401*** 1.548***
(0.299) (0.350) (0.345)
Log of total population -0.603** 0.325 -0.385
(0.297) (0.502) (0.354)
Labor force participation rate 0.023 -0.604 -0.047
(0.630) (0.502) (0.589)
Exp/GDP -1.245*** -1.243*** -1.139***
(0.362) (0.302) (0.366)
Imp/GDP 1.384*** 1.166*** 1.209***
(0.336) (0.279) (0.332)
Manufacturing/GDP -0.844*** -0.597 -0.732
(0.160) (0.450) (0.819)
Agriculture/GDP -3.479* -4.000** -4.816**
(1.817) (1.757) (2.193)
Log of exchange rate 0.083 -0.340*** 0.046
(0.059) (0.088) (0.117)
Tariff rate -0.689 1.056* -0.131
(1.091) (0.598) (1.089)
Constant 19.374*** -13.030** -17.868**
(0.100) (5.742) (7.882)
Observations 1,049 1,002 1,002 1,053 1,053
R-squared 0.960 0.922 0.991 N/A N/A
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Time trends No No Linear N/A N/A
Unobserved factors N/A N/A N/A 3 1
Standard errors are robust and clustered at country level. Standard errors in column (4) and
(5) are bootstraps (blocked at the country level) of 1,000 times.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
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Table 16: Regression Estimates of Railways on Gross Export
FE GSC
Dep: log of gross export (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Railway connection -0.300 -0.446*** 0.071 0.166 -0.107
(0.183) (0.135) (0.114) (0.448) (0.417)
Log of GDP at 2010 USD 2.232*** 0.826 2.509***
(0.547) (0.499) (0.763)
Log of total population -1.847** -1.242 -2.188***
(0.894) (0.861) (1.114)
Labor force participation rate -1.275 -1.751 0.598
(1.364) (2.286) (1.444)
Exp/GDP 2.444*** 1.838*** 1.749**
(0.830) (0.605) (0.825)
Imp/GDP -1.914* -0.535 -1.068*
(1.005) (0.614) (1.020)
Manufacturing/GDP 0.660 -2.419** 0.822
(0.464) (0.911) (2.575)
Agriculture/GDP 4.850 5.511 2.113
(3.072) (5.540) (4.347)
Log of exchange rate -0.102 -0.123 0.008
(0.209) (0.191) (0.388)
Tariff rate -1.093 -0.926 0.021
(2.711) (1.989) (3.313)
Constant 17.671*** -9.090 10.639
(0.199) (18.121) (13.021)
Observations 1,050 1,004 1,004 1,053 1,053
R-squared 0.918 0.687 0.962 N/A N/A
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Time trends No No Linear N/A N/A
Unobserved factors N/A N/A N/A 4 3
Standard errors are robust and clustered at country level. Standard errors in column (4) and
(5) are bootstraps (blocked at the country level) of 1,000 times.




Matching FHFA and MSA geographic codes
There are 283 MSAs in my marriage data organized from a combined data set of 2000 census, 2005-
2007, and 2009-2011 ACS. 259 of them can directly match to MSAs in FHFA HPI data. 8 of the
remaining 24 MSAs are matched to the same FHFA MSAs. The last 16 MSAs are mappedto the
nearest FHFA MSAs. The following table list 24 MSAs and its corresponding FHFA MSAs:
Census MSAs FHFA MSAs
120 Brockton, Ma 14454 Boston, MA
380 Kenosha, WI 16974 Chicago-Naperville-Arlington Heights, IL
320 Hamilton-Middleton, OH 17140 Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN
275 Fort Walton Beach, FL 18880 Crestview-Fort Walton Beach-Destin, FL
202 Daytona Beach, FL 19660 Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL
361 Jamestown-Dunkirk, NY 21500 Erie, PA
87 Benton Harbor, MI 24340 Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI
92 Biloxi-Gulfport, MS 24860 Greenville-Anderson-Mauldin, SC
292 Galveston-Texas City, TX 26420 Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
260 Fitchburg-Leominster, MA 31700 Manchester-Nashua, NH
519 Monmouth-Ocean, NJ 35084 Newark, NJ-PA
548 New Haven-Meriden, CT 35300 New Haven-Milford, CT
566 Newburgh-Middletown, NY 35614 New York-Jersey City-White Plains, NY-NJ
751 Sarasota, FL 35840 North Port-Sarasota-Bradenton, FL
873 Ventura-Oxnard-Simi Valley, CA 37100 Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA
490 Melbourne-Titusville-Cocoa-Palm Bay, FL 37340Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL
271 Fort Pierce, FL 38940 Port St. Lucie, FL
540 New Bedford, MA 39300 Providence-Warwick, RI-MA
927 Yolo, CA 40900 Sacramento–Roseville–Arden-Arcade, CA
761 Sharon, PA 49660 Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA
535 Nashua, NH 31700 Manchester-Nashua, NH
193 Danbury, CT 35300 New Haven-Milford, CT
804 Stamford, CT 35300 New Haven-Milford, CT
888 Waterbury, CT 35300 New Haven-Milford, CT
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Appendix Graphs
Figure A1: Correlation between Changes in Housing Permits and Home Prices, 2000-2006
Notes: This figure is the replication of Figure 6 in Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo(2018). The red line is the regression
weighted by 18-55 adult population in 2000, and the sample includes 275 MSAs. Yuba city has extraordinary growth
in housing permit, so it is excluded from the figure.
Figure A2: Time Variation in Housing Demand across MSAs
Notes: This figure is the replication of Figure 7 in Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo(2018). The lines are time series
of the housing demand index (HDI) at the tenth percentile, median, and ninetieth percentile. The HDI is the average
sum of prices and permits, which is normalized to 1990 values by each percentile.
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Figure A3: Variation in Structure Break across MSAs
Notes: This graphs include quarterly normalized HPI for six MSAs between 2000:I and 2005:I. The solid line is HPI,
and the dashed line is fitted line before and after the structure break.The grey vertical line shows the time may have
structure break. The first column include three MSAs with a smaller estimated structure break, while the second
column includes the MSAs with a larger structure break.
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Figure A4: Relationship between Instrument and Change in Housing Demand
Notes: This figure reports the correlation between the magnitude of structural break and the estimated housing
demand change during 2000-2006.
Figure A5: Housing Price Growth, Boom and Bust
Notes: The figure shows the correlation between the housing price growth in 2000-2006 and the one in 2006-2011
across 275 MSAs. The black line is fitted line which with the slope of -1.
85
(a) Treated and Counterfactual Averages: Gross Import
(b) Treated and Counterfactual Averages: Gross Export
Figure A6: The Dynamic Effect of Railways on Trade by DID Method
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(a) Treated and Counterfactual Averages: Gross Import
(b) Estimated ATT: Gross Import
Figure A7: The Effect of Railways on Gross Import by Matrix Completion Method
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(a) Treated and Counterfactual Averages: Gross Export
(b) Estimated ATT: Gross Export
Figure A8: The Effect of Railways on Gross Export by Matrix Completion Method
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(a) Food and Live Animals (b) Crude Materials
(c) Chemicals and Related Products (d) Manufactured Goods
(e) Machinery/Transport Goods (f) Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles
Figure A9: The Impact of Railways on Gross Import by Product Classifications
Notes: The figure presents GSC estimates of the impact of New Silk Road Railways on trade. The confidence intervals
are generated by block bootstrap of 1,000 times.
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(a) Food and Live Animals (b) Crude Materials
(c) Chemicals and Related Products (d) Manufactured Goods
(e) Machinery/Transport Goods (f) Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles
Figure A10: The Impact of Railways on Gross Export by Product Classifications
Notes: The figure presents GSC estimates of the impact of New Silk Road Railways on trade. The confidence intervals
are generated by block bootstrap of 1,000 times.
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(a) Treated and Counterfactual Averages: Gross Import
(b) Estimated ATT: Gross Import
Figure A11: The Effect of Railways on Gross Import of Countries Sharing Boundary with China by
GSCM
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(a) Treated and Counterfactual Averages: Gross Export
(b) Estimated ATT: Gross Export
Figure A12: The Effect of Railways on Gross Export of Countries Sharing Boundary with China by
GSCM
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(a) Treated and Counterfactual Averages: Gross Import
(b) Estimated ATT: Gross Import
Figure A13: The Effect of Railways on Gross Import of Countries not Sharing Boundary with China
by GSCM
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(a) Treated and Counterfactual Averages: Gross Export
(b) Estimated ATT: Gross Export
Figure A14: The Effect of Railways on Gross Export of Countries not Sharing Boundary with China
by GSCM
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(a) Belarus (b) Germany (c) Kazakhstan
(d) Poland (e) Russian Federation (f) Czech Republic
(g) France (h) Mongolia (i) Spain
Figure A15: The Impact of Railways on Gross Import by Product Classifications
Notes: The figure presents GSC estimates of the impact of New Silk Road Railways on each countries’ trade with
China. The confidence intervals are generated by block bootstrap of 1,000 times.
95
(j) Mongolia (k) Netherlands (l) Iran
(m) United Kingdom (n) Hungary
Figure A15: The Impact of Railways on Gross Import by Product Classifications (Cont.)
Notes: The figure presents GSC estimates of the impact of New Silk Road Railways on each countries’ trade with
China. The confidence intervals are generated by block bootstrap of 1,000 times.
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(a) Belarus (b) Germany (c) Kazakhstan
(d) Poland (e) Russian Federation (f) Czech Republic
(g) France (h) Mongolia (i) Spain
Figure A16: The Impact of Railways on Gross Export by Product Classifications
Notes: The figure presents GSC estimates of the impact of New Silk Road Railways on each countries’ trade with
China. The confidence intervals are generated by block bootstrap of 1,000 times.
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(j) Mongolia (k) Netherlands (l) Iran
(m) United Kingdom (n) Hungary
Figure A16: The Impact of Railways on Gross Export by Product Classifications (Cont.)
Notes: The figure presents GSC estimates of the impact of New Silk Road Railways on each countries’ trade with
China. The confidence intervals are generated by block bootstrap of 1,000 times.
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Appendix Tables
Table A1: Housing Demand Shock and Labor Market Outcomes: OLS Estimates (Full)
Dependent variable: 2000-2006 change in Emp. Rate Avg. wage Emp. Rate Avg. wage
Age 18-25 Age 26-33
Panel A. OLS estimates: all people
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.022*** 0.064*** 0.015*** 0.034***
(0.006) (0.014) (0.005) (0.010)
Log of the age 18-55 population in 2000 -0.005*** -0.005 -0.002* -0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
Female age 18-33 employment rate in 2000 -0.133** 0.084 -0.207*** -0.079
(0.051) (0.087) (0.041) (0.065)
Employed age 18-33 with college degree in 2000 -0.073 0.040 0.077** -0.073
(0.045) (0.084) (0.032) (0.074)
Foreign born share in 2000 0.252 1.356 0.081 2.061*
(0.540) (0.880) (0.408) (1.075)
Constant 0.130*** -0.052 0.150*** 0.159*
(0.046) (0.072) (0.034) (0.079)
R2 0.331 0.255 0.326 0.243
Panel B. OLS estimates: Men
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.025*** 0.081*** 0.022** 0.042***
(0.007) (0.018) (0.008) (0.011)
Log of the age 18-55 population in 2000 -0.004** -0.010** -0.003 -0.008
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006)
Female age 18-33 employment rate in 2000 -0.139** 0.070 -0.095 -0.146
(0.058) (0.110) (0.078) (0.088)
Employed age 18-33 with college degree in 2000 -0.081 0.095 0.012 0.021
(0.055) (0.099) (0.040) (0.092)
Foreign born share in 2000 0.310 1.675* 0.933 1.931
(0.677) (0.980) (0.627) (1.315)
Constant 0.119** -0.010 0.079 0.204**
(0.054) (0.084) (0.064) (0.097)
R2 0.235 0.267 0.206 0.201
Panel C. OLS estimates: Women
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.033*** 0.040*** 0.004 0.018
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011)
Log of the age 18-55 population in 2000 -0.011*** 0.001 -0.005* -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Female age 18-33 employment rate in 2000 -0.039 0.115 -0.213*** -0.001
(0.127) (0.096) (0.073) (0.063)
Employed age 18-33 with college degree in 2000 -0.030 -0.063 0.197*** -0.216***
(0.071) (0.086) (0.058) (0.062)
Foreign born share in 2000 -1.508 0.422 1.807 1.651
(1.240) (1.145) (1.552) (1.024)
Constant 0.146 -0.091 0.157*** 0.108
(0.106) (0.096) (0.055) (0.083)
R2 0.104 0.067 0.041 0.144
Obs. 275 275 275 275
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
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Table A2: Decomposition of Housing Demand Shock and Labor Market Outcomes: OLS Estimates
Dependent variable: 2000-2006 change in Emp. Rate Avg. wage Emp. Rate Avg. wage
People Age 18-25 People Age 26-33
OLS estimates
All people
Change in housing prices 0.022*** 0.108*** 0.023*** 0.049**
(0.008) (0.021) (0.008) (0.021)
Change in housing permits 0.021** 0.030* 0.009 0.023
(0.009) (0.015) (0.005) (0.015)
P-value of test: ∆Pm = ∆Qm 0.944 0.002 0.107 0.374
R2 0.331 0.291 0.332 0.249
Men
Change in housing prices 0.024** 0.131*** 0.013 0.061**
(0.009) (0.027) (0.010) (0.024)
Change in housing permits 0.026** 0.041** 0.029*** 0.028*
(0.011) (0.019) (0.009) (0.016)
P-value of test: ∆Pm = ∆Qm 0.894 0.004 0.117 0.316
R2 0.235 0.298 0.211 0.207
Women
Change in housing prices 0.057*** 0.071*** 0.006 0.022
(0.017) (0.017) (0.034) (0.015)
Change in housing permits 0.015 0.015 0.002 0.014
(0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018)
P-value of test: ∆Pm = ∆Qm 0.122 0.027 0.9245 0.765
R2 0.113 0.081 0.041 0.145
Obs. 275 275 275 275
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
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Table A3: Housing Demand Shock and Marriage Outcomes: OLS Estimates (Full)
Dependent variable: 2000-2006 change in marriage rate
Age 18-25 Age 26-33
Panel A. OLS estimates: all people
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.009*** 0.000
(0.003) (0.005)
Log of the age 18-55 population in 2000 -0.004** 0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
Female age 18-33 employment rate in 2000 0.039 0.131***
(0.026) (0.030)
Employed age 18-33 with college degree in 2000 0.142*** 0.017
(0.026) (0.038)





Panel B. OLS estimates: Men
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.012*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.005)
Log of the age 18-55 population in 2000 -0.004* -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Female age 18-33 employment rate in 2000 0.051 0.103**
(0.033) (0.045)
Employed age 18-33 with college degree in 2000 0.133*** 0.026
(0.028) (0.039)





Panel C. OLS estimates: Women
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.005 0.002
(0.004) (0.006)
Log of the age 18-55 population in 2000 -0.003** 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Female age 18-33 employment rate in 2000 0.022 0.160***
(0.031) (0.035)
Employed age 18-33 with college degree in 2000 0.145*** 0.006
(0.026) (0.049)






Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
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Table A4: The 2000-2006 Housing Boom and Marriage Outcomes by Home Ownership
Dependent variable: change in Marriage rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. 2SLS estimates All Owners Owners with loan Owners without loan Renters
All people age 18-25
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.009*** 0.009** 0.001 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) -0.009
Men age 18-25
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.007** 0.007** 0.000 0.010
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.007)
Women age 18-25
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.011*** 0.007** 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.011)
Panel B. 2SLS estimates
All people age 26-33
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.009) (0.010) (0.002) -0.011
Men age 26-33
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.003
(0.011) (0.012) (0.002) (0.013)
Women age 26-33
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.006 0.001 0.004* 0.003
(0.004) (0.011) (0.002) (0.010)
First stage F-statistic 48.940 48.940 48.940 48.940
Obs. 275 275 275 275
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
Table A5: Housing Booms and Fertility Rate Defined by Conception
Dependent variable: 2000-2006 change in Fertility rate Nonmarital birth rate
Panel A. 2SLS estimates for women age 18-25
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.001 -0.038
(0.008) (0.039)
Panel B. 2SLS estimates for women age 26-33
Housing demand change 2000-2006 0.004 -0.022
(0.006) (0.018)
First stage F-statistic 46.055 46.055
Obs. 235 235
Baseline controls Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
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Table A6: Multinomial Logit Model with Fixed Effects for Fuel Choice, Rural and Urban Households
Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Clean Only Mixed Clean Only Mixed
Household size 0.030 0.127*** 0.048 0.107***
(0.025) (0.013) (0.029) (0.025)
Deopendency ratio -0.158 -0.178*** -0.148 -0.069
(0.100) (0.057) (0.101) (0.092)
Main income source: salary 0.918*** 0.393*** 0.098 0.011
(0.153) (0.098) (0.215) (0.192)
Main income source: non-agriculture wage -0.293 -0.222** -0.257 -0.056
(0.183) (0.097) (0.198) (0.170)
Main income source: trade 0.500*** 0.417*** -0.167 -0.167
(0.183) (0.118) (0.216) (0.195)
Log real per capita consumption expenditure 0.536*** 0.416*** 0.729*** 0.664***
(0.094) (0.058) (0.119) (0.113)
Female head -0.090 0.017 0.201 0.026
(0.201) (0.123) (0.222) (0.193)
Age of head -0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.007
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Head’s years of education 0.054*** 0.043*** 0.086*** 0.056***
(0.019) (0.012) (0.022) (0.021)
Log firewood price 0.299*** 0.087** 1.106*** 0.272
(0.069) (0.039) (0.210) (0.190)
Log coal price 0.097** 0.019 0.049 0.099**
(0.045) (0.025) (0.045) (0.047)
Log dung price -0.086* -0.203***
(0.045) (0.031)
Log kerosene price 0.502*** 0.431*** 0.065 -0.107
(0.169) (0.103) (0.357) (0.321)
Log LPG price 0.311 -0.215 1.900 -0.329
(0.451) (0.186) (1.443) (1.291)
Nearest town distance (km) 0.004 0.001
(0.007) (0.004)
Village has no paved road -0.039 -0.150
(0.162) (0.092)
Percentage of households electrified -0.005* -0.003**
(0.003) (0.001)
Village main fuel is clean 0.706*** 0.542***
(0.158) (0.107)
Village main fuel is biomass 0.139 0.375***
(0.134) (0.084)
Year controls Yes Yes
Log likelihood -2753.62 -1,626.95
Observations 10,628 10,628 5,738 5,738
Biomass fuel only is base category. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
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Table A7: Multinomial Logit Model with Random Effects Including Women Bargaining Power
Measures
Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Clean only Mixed Clean only Mixed
SC/ST -1.382*** -1.268*** -2.002*** -0.976***
(0.115) (0.071) (0.162) (0.142)
Muslim -0.003 -0.070 -1.570*** -0.755***
(0.145) (0.090) (0.169) (0.148)
Other Backward Class (OBC) -0.670*** -0.598*** -1.252*** -0.752***
(0.097) (0.062) (0.146) (0.132)
Household size 0.030* 0.116*** 0.011 0.133***
(0.017) (0.009) (0.021) (0.018)
Deopendency ratio -0.184** -0.326*** -0.207** -0.210***
(0.077) (0.045) (0.085) (0.073)
Main income source: salary 2.083*** 1.178*** 2.322*** 1.044***
(0.105) (0.069) (0.167) (0.140)
Main income source: non-agriculture wage 0.327*** 0.016 0.402*** -0.093
(0.121) (0.063) (0.156) (0.125)
Main income source: trade 2.025*** 0.848*** 1.770*** 0.460***
(0.111) (0.074) (0.162) (0.135)
Log real per capita consumption expenditure 1.661*** 1.262*** 2.128*** 1.226***
(0.071) (0.045) (0.102) (0.092)
Female head 0.650*** 0.585*** 1.008*** 0.541***
(0.167) (0.100) (0.183) (0.160)
Age of head 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.020***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Head’s years of education 0.265*** 0.187*** 0.326*** 0.168***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013)
Log firewood price 0.186*** 0.050* 1.187*** -0.072
(0.051) (0.030) (0.143) (0.122)
Log coal price -0.041 0.110*** -0.060* 0.290***
(0.034) (0.020) (0.036) (0.032)
Log dung price -0.142*** -0.345***
(0.037) (0.024)
Log kerosene price 0.654*** 0.556*** 1.632*** 0.338*
(0.123) (0.078) (0.210) (0.180)
Log LPG price -0.071 -0.258** -4.200*** -2.682***
(0.274) (0.131) (0.922) (0.819)
Nearest town distance (km) -0.009** -0.011***
(0.004) (0.002)
Village has no paved road -0.731*** -0.363***
(0.111) (0.059)
Percentage of households electrified 0.018*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.001)
Village main fuel is clean 1.223*** 0.733***
(0.124) (0.083)
Village main fuel is biomass -0.533*** -0.311***
(0.113) (0.070)
Biomass fuel only is base category. Standard errors in parentheses.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
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Table A7: Multinomial Logit Model with Random Effects Including Women Bargaining Power Measures (Cont.)
Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Clean only Mixed Clean only Mixed
Education gap 0.099*** 0.070*** 0.124*** 0.063***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009)
Violence 0.031 -0.124*** 0.078* -0.032
(0.037) (0.023) (0.044) (0.039)
Most say in decition macking 0.032 0.022 -0.060 -0.105***
(0.039) (0.024) (0.044) (0.039)
Financial independence 0.220*** 0.195*** 0.482*** 0.212***
(0.036) (0.023) (0.046) (0.042)
Freedom 0.025 0.005 0.081* 0.030
(0.037) (0.023) (0.043) (0.038)
Constant -20.689*** -13.010*** 3.040 4.676








Region controls Yes Yes
Year controls Yes Yes
Log likelihood -17908.13 -10,600.323
Observations 36,074 36,074 15,455 15,455
Biomass fuel only is base category. Standard errors in parentheses.
*: Significant at 10%. **: Significant at 5%. ***: Significant at 1%.
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Table A8: Multinomial Logit Model with Fixed Effects Including Women Bargaining Power Measures
Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Clean Only Mixed Clean Only Mixed
Household size -0.025 0.092*** 0.027 0.096**
(0.037) (0.018) (0.046) (0.040)
Deopendency ratio -0.081 -0.188** -0.221 -0.124
(0.158) (0.091) (0.164) (0.144)
Main income source: salary 0.778*** 0.139 0.178 -0.020
(0.239) (0.145) (0.331) (0.290)
Main income source: non-agriculture wage -0.487* -0.199 -0.212 -0.254
(0.263) (0.137) (0.292) (0.244)
Main income source: trade 0.092 0.193 -0.266 -0.215
(0.255) (0.167) (0.324) (0.290)
Log real per capita consumption expenditure 0.518*** 0.290*** 1.004*** 0.842***
(0.140) (0.082) (0.188) (0.179)
Female head -0.788** -0.208 0.791* 0.476
(0.393) (0.228) (0.407) (0.341)
Age of head 0.005 0.012** -0.008 0.005
(0.009) (0.005) (0.011) (0.009)
Head’s years of education 0.029 0.038** 0.090*** 0.059*
(0.029) (0.018) (0.033) (0.033)
Log firewood price 0.286*** 0.133** 1.045*** 0.574**
(0.101) (0.055) (0.309) (0.267)
Log coal price 0.161** 0.000 0.065 0.125*
(0.068) (0.036) (0.066) (0.065)
Log dung price -0.126** -0.229***
(0.064) (0.043)
Log kerosene price 0.768*** 0.458*** -0.146 -0.518
(0.242) (0.148) (0.514) (0.464)
Log LPG price -0.422 -0.138 -1.171 -3.743**
(0.679) (0.215) (2.131) (1.907)
Nearest town distance (km) -0.006 0.005
(0.010) (0.005)
Village has no paved road -0.183 -0.123
(0.231) (0.132)
Percentage of households electrified -0.006 -0.005**
(0.004) (0.002)
Village main fuel is clean 0.514** 0.377**
(0.241) (0.154)
Village main fuel is biomass 0.065 0.291**
(0.190) (0.115)
Education gap -0.005 -0.008 0.060*** 0.049**
(0.018) (0.011) (0.021) (0.019)
Violence 0.074 -0.021 0.237*** 0.067
(0.068) (0.040) (0.075) (0.072)
Most say in decition macking -0.140* 0.016 -0.023 -0.021
(0.075) (0.045) (0.077) (0.071)
Financial independence 0.048 0.160*** 0.118 0.055
(0.065) (0.042) (0.081) (0.078)
Freedom 0.009 0.038 0.086 0.163**
(0.037) (0.023) (0.043) (0.038)
Year controls Yes Yes
Log likelihood -1429.066 -871.67
Observations 5,716 5,716 3,236 3,236
Biomass fuel only is base category. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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